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ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE 
DENIAL OF HEALTH CARE TO DREAMERS 
FATMA MAROUF

 
ABSTRACT 
In the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), passed in 2010, Congress 
provided that only “lawfully present” individuals could obtain 
insurance through the Marketplaces established under the Act. 
Congress left it to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) to define who is “lawfully present.” Initially, HHS 
included all individuals with deferred action status, which is an 
authorized period of stay but not a legal status. After President 
Obama announced a new policy of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (“DACA”) in June 2012, however, HHS amended its 
regulation specifically to exclude DACA recipients from the 
definition of “lawfully present.” The revised regulation denied 
DREAMers—undocumented immigrants brought to the United 
States as children—access to affordable health care, while 
providing it to similarly situated individuals who had been granted 
deferred action through other means. This Article examines whether 
the exclusion of DREAMers from the ACA violates equal protection 
principles, highlighting critical inconsistencies and gaps in the case 
law on standards of review for alienage classifications. A circuit 
split exists about whether non-legal permanent residents are ever 
entitled to strict scrutiny, and the extent of the Executive’s power 
over immigration remains unclear, as does the allocation of power 
within the executive branch. In addition, courts are divided about 
the standard of review that applies when states discriminate against 
noncitizens pursuant to a federal statute. All of these issues 
complicate the analysis and underscore the need to reevaluate an 
unraveling tiered approach to judicial review.   
 
 
  B.A., Yale University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Professor of Law and Director of the 
Immigrant Rights Clinic, Texas A&M University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The application of equal protection principles to noncitizens remains 
one of the most perplexing areas of constitutional law. While courts have 
tried to articulate various principles to synthesize the case law in this area, 
inconsistencies and uncertainties remain pervasive. As one federal 
appellate court judge recently recognized, “What is remarkable is that 
seventy-five years after United States v. Carolene Products Co. announced 
the need for ‘more exacting judicial scrutiny’ for ‘discrete and insular 
minorities,’ . . . we should be divided over the proper standard of review 
for classifications based on alienage.”
1
 
The general rule of thumb is that alienage-based classifications receive 
strict scrutiny when made by states, since alienage, like race, is a suspect 
classification, but rational basis review applies when such classifications 
are made by the federal government, due to its plenary power over 
immigration. The problem is that this approach is plagued with unresolved 
questions. In terms of discrimination by states, a circuit split exists about 
whether strict scrutiny applies only to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) 
or extends to noncitizens with other types of status, such as individuals 
with temporary work visas, asylum, withholding of removal, or parole.
2
 In 
addition, courts are divided about what to do with “hybrid” statutes, where 
Congress gives states discretion to decide whether or not to discriminate 
against certain categories of noncitizens. Some courts have held that states 
have no real option to discriminate in this situation, while others have 
upheld discriminatory actions by states on the basis that they are following 
a federal direction. 
Just as complicated are questions involving discrimination against 
noncitizens by the federal government. While the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that Congress and the President have plenary power over 
immigration, the allocation of power between the legislative and executive 
branches remains unclear. The lawsuit brought by twenty-six states 
challenging President Obama’s executive actions on immigration 
highlights this issue. Even more confusing—and less theorized—is the 
scope of the plenary power within the executive branch. The Supreme 
Court has issued only one, opaque decision addressing alienage-based 
classifications by an executive agency that does not have direct 
 
 
 1. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
 2. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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responsibility over immigration.
3
 In that case, the Court found the 
agency’s classification unconstitutional but applied a due process analysis 
to address an equal protection issue.
4
 Consequently, there is still an open 
question about what standard of scrutiny applies to alienage-based 
classifications by federal agencies whose expertise is not immigration. 
An issue that calls attention to these gaps and tensions in equal 
protection jurisprudence is the exclusion of DREAMers from the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or “Act”). The term “DREAMers” is used to 
describe undocumented individuals who came to the United States as 
children, went to school here, and consider themselves American. They 
are the group that would have benefited from the Development, Relief, 
and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, legislation that 
Congress has introduced several times since 2001 but never passed into 
law.
5
 They are also the group that has benefited from the policy of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), introduced by the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2012, which has 
requirements resembling the DREAM Act, as it requires entering the 
United States before the age of sixteen, living here continuously for at 
least five years, satisfying certain educational requirements, and passing 
criminal background checks. Unlike the DREAM Act, however, DACA 
does not create a path to permanent residency or citizenship; it simply 
allows qualifying individuals to apply for deferred action.  
Deferred action is a temporary period of authorized stay granted by 
DHS that allows someone to apply for employment authorization but does 
not confer a legal status. As DHS has explained, “Deferred action is a 
long-standing administrative mechanism dating back decades, by which 
the Secretary of Homeland Security may defer the removal of an 
undocumented immigrant for a period of time.”
6
 It is “a form of 
prosecutorial discretion by which the Secretary deprioritizes an 
individual’s case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience, or 
 
 
 3. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).  
 4. Id. at 99–117. 
 5. See American Dream Act, H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); American Dream Act, 
H.R. 1275, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 2075, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); 
DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2001). 
 6. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Léon Rodríguez, Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.aila.org/ 
infonet/dhs-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion [hereinafter Memorandum on Expanded DACA and 
DAPA]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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in the interest of the Department’s overall enforcement mission.”
7
 For 
example, DHS typically grants deferred action status to certain classes of 
individuals, including, but not limited to: abused spouses and children of 
US citizens and permanent residents with approved self-petitions; 
immediate relatives of certain US citizens killed in combat; victims of 
crimes who have demonstrated prima facie eligibility for U or T visas; and 
important witnesses in investigations or prosecutions.
8
 In addition to such 
classes, DHS has discretion to grant deferred action in any removal case 
where the individual is a low enforcement priority.
9
 Even noncitizens who 
have already been ordered deported may be granted deferred action based 
on sympathetic facts if their removal is not a priority. DACA therefore 
represents just one of many ways to be granted deferred action. 
The key question for purposes of access to affordable health care is 
whether individuals granted deferred action through DACA should be 
considered “lawfully present” in the United States. The ACA explicitly 
limits access to its health insurance Marketplaces and tax credits to 
individuals who are “lawfully present” but does not define this term.
10
 
Instead, Congress left it to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) to define who is “lawfully present.”
11
 Initially, in 2010, HHS 
 
 
 7. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (describing deferred action as “an act of 
administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority”). 
 8. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS 4 (2011) (discussing deferred action 
status for important witnesses) [hereinafter TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS]; Battered Spouse, Children 
& Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-
spouse-children-parents (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/EHE9-YCKB (“If 
your Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant is approved and you do not 
have legal immigration status in the United States, we may place you in deferred action, which allows 
you to remain in the United States.”); Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigra 
nt-status (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/AYX4-7V56 (“Petitioners placed on 
the waiting list will be granted deferred action or parole and are eligible to apply for work 
authorization while waiting for additional U visas to become available.”); Memorandum on Expanded 
DACA and DAPA, supra note 6, at 2 nn.2–3.  
 9. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland 
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement et al. 2 (Nov. 
20, 2014), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecut 
orial_discretion.pdf (discussing the use of deferred action for cases that are low priorities); Karl R. 
Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Op. for 
the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. and the Counsel to the President 18–19 (Nov. 19, 2014), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prior 
itize-removal.pdf (same); Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6, at 2 (same); 
TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 8, at 4 (same). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2014). 
 11. Id. § 18081. 
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included all individuals with deferred action status in its definition of 
“lawfully present.”
12
 However, after President Obama announced DACA 
in June 2012, HHS changed its interpretation to exclude DACA recipients 
from the definition of “lawfully present,” even though it continued to 
include all other individuals with deferred action status.
13
 HHS’s decision 
to treat some individuals with deferred action as “lawfully present” while 
excluding others with the exact same status raises a serious equal 
protection issue. Yet the standard of review that applies in this situation 
remains unclear. 
In determining the proper standard of review for the disparate treatment 
of DACA recipients under the ACA, one must grapple with at least three 
unresolved questions. First, there is an open question about whether 
noncitizens with deferred action status are ever entitled to heightened 
scrutiny. Second, although HHS is part of the federal government, it is an 
agency that does not have direct responsibility over immigration, so there 
is a question about whether it is entitled to deference under the plenary 
power doctrine. Third, since states can choose whether to create their own 
Marketplaces under the ACA, a question arises whether choosing to do so 
involves engaging in prohibited discrimination, or whether such 
discrimination is permitted because the states are merely following a 
federal directive.  
Part I of this Article provides background information about the 
exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA, including the legislative 
history that led to this exclusion and its far-reaching consequences for 
DREAMers. Part II describes the overt discord and covert gaps in equal 
protection cases involving noncitizens, examining the issues that plague 
alienage-based classifications by both state and federal governments, as 
well as the controversy surrounding Congressional delegation of the power 
to discriminate to states. Part III then examines the relevance of these 
questions to HHS’s decision to exclude DACA recipients from the ACA, 
exploring whether heightened scrutiny should apply in this situation and, if 
not, whether the differential treatment of DREAMers would survive even 
rational basis review. This Part also explores whether states that apply 
HHS’s discriminatory regulation through their own Marketplaces are 
engaging in prohibited discrimination subject to strict scrutiny. Part IV 
offers a path through this quagmire by making explicit what has already 
occurred in practice: abandonment of a tiered approach to standards of 
 
 
 12. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi) (2010). 
 13. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi), (8) (2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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review. This Part suggests adopting a more flexible, sliding-scale 
approach. Part IV also examines alternative modes of legal analysis as a 
way to avoid the equal protection conundrum, such as administrative law 
challenges to the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA, but 
contends that it is still essential to clarify how courts should review 
alienage-based classifications.  
Nearly eight hundred thousand individuals have been granted deferred 
action through DACA thus far.
14
 In November 2014, DHS announced an 
expansion of the DACA policy, as well as a new policy of Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(“DAPA”).
15
 Together, these new policies could provide deferred action to 
up to 5.2 million people.
16
 The policies have not yet been implemented, 
however, due to a lawsuit filed by twenty-six states that led to a 
preliminary injunction putting them on hold until the case is resolved.
17
 
HHS has not yet passed any regulations regarding the treatment of 
expanded DACA or DAPA recipients under the ACA, but it is expected to 
exclude them, just like original DACA recipients, if the policies survive.
18
 
The disparate treatment of different groups of individuals with deferred 
action is therefore a pressing issue that could affect millions of lives.  
 
 
 14. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NUMBER OF I-
821D, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, 
QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS AND CASE STATUS: 2012–2016 (DECEMBER 31) (2016), available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821d-deferred-acti 
on-childhood-arrivals [hereinafter USCIS DATA SET].  
 15. See Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6. 
 16. Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, All Eyes on U.S. Federal Courts as Deferred Action 
Programs Halted, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
article/all-eyes-us-federal-courts-deferred-action-programs-halted, archived at https://perma.cc/C4YG-
KVK8. 
 17. See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam) 
(affirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision denying the federal government’s appeal of the preliminary 
injunction by an equally divided Court); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying 
the federal government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016); 
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying the federal government’s motion to stay 
or narrow the preliminary injunction); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(granting the preliminary injunction). Since the appeal to the Supreme Court involved only a 
preliminary injunction, the Court may have an opportunity to revisit the case after a final judgment. 
 18. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., DACA AND DAPA ACCESS TO FEDERAL HEALTH AND 
ECONOMIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS 1 (2015).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. EXCLUSION OF DACA RECIPIENTS FROM THE ACA 
A. Legislative History 
The Affordable Care Act became law in March 2010 after a highly 
contentious and divisive political process. The purpose of the Act is to 
increase the number of insured individuals and reduce the cost of health 
care. Under prior rules, health insurance companies could deny insurance 
based on a preexisting condition, charge more based on an applicant’s 
gender or location, and cancel an insurance policy once an individual 
started using it.
19
 The ACA prevents insurance companies from taking 
these actions. In addition to creating a federal “Marketplace” (also called 
an “Exchange”) for consumers to purchase health insurance, the Act 
allows states to create their own health insurance Marketplaces. There are 
currently two types of state-based Marketplaces. In one kind, the state is 
responsible for performing all of the Marketplace functions, including 
receiving applications through its own website. In the other kind, which is 
called a “federally-supported” state-based Marketplace, the state performs 
all Marketplace functions, except that it relies on the federal government’s 
IT platform, so consumers apply for coverage through healthcare.gov. 
Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia have totally state-
based Marketplaces, and four states have “federally-supported” state-based 
Marketplaces. In addition, seven states have “state-partnership” 
Marketplaces, where the state provides in-person consumer assistance, and 
HHS performs all other marketplace functions.
 
The remaining twenty-
seven states use the federal Marketplace, where HHS performs all 
functions.
20
 Only insurance companies that agree to follow the Act’s rules 
can sell insurance plans in these Marketplaces.  
The Act also helps consumers pay for health insurance by providing 
two types of tax credits that are based on household income. First, the Act 
provides “premium tax credits” that help reduce the cost of health 
insurance premiums.
21
 Second, the Act provides “cost-sharing reductions” 
 
 
 19. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: EXCLUSION OF 
YOUTH GRANTED “DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS” FROM AFFORDABLE HEALTH 
CARE 2–3, 7–8 (2013), archived at https://perma.cc/9KP5-6LVX. 
 20. For a table showing which states use which types of Marketplaces, see State Health 
Insurance Marketplace Types, 2016, HENRY FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/64K9-GWER. 
 21. I.R.C. § 36B (2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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that limit the cost of copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles.
22
 These 
tax credits are available to households with incomes at or below 400 
percent of the federal poverty level that buy private health insurance 
through a Marketplace and file federal tax returns.
23
 
In order to be eligible for a health plan offered through a Marketplace 
under the Act or to claim either of the tax credits, an individual must be “a 
citizen or national of the United States or . . . lawfully present in the 
United States.”
24
 Congress did not define “lawfully present” in the statute, 
but instead left it to the Department of Health and Human Services to do 
so as part of establishing a program that meets the requirements of the 
Act.
25
 One of the Act’s key provisions is that it prohibits the denial of 
health insurance or inflation of rates based on preexisting medical 
conditions.
26
 Since this provision did not become effective until January 1, 
2014, § 1101 of the Act directed HHS to establish a temporary high-risk 
health insurance program to provide immediate access to coverage for 
eligible noninsured individuals with preexisting conditions. Eligibility 
under this temporary program was similarly limited to US citizens, 
nationals, and individuals “lawfully present” in the country.
27
 
On July 30, 2010, HHS issued an interim final regulation implementing 
§ 1101 of the Act.
28
 This regulation provides that an individual is eligible 
to enroll in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (“PCIP”) program if 
he or she is “a citizen or national of the United States or lawfully present 
in the United States.”
29
 HHS defined “lawfully present” in the interim 
final regulation at 45 C.F.R. § 152.2. This definition included, among 
many other categories, “[a]liens currently in deferred action status.”
30
 
HHS subsequently passed regulations implementing the Affordable 
Insurance Exchanges and premium tax credits that cross-referenced this 
definition of “lawfully present.”
31
 Furthermore, the same definition of 
 
 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2014). 
 23. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(f) (2016). 
 24. I.R.C. § 36B(e)(2) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18032(f)(3), 18071(e)(2) (emphasis 
added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18082(d). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 18081. 
 26. Id. § 18001. 
 27. See id. § 18001(d). 
 28. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,014 (July 30, 2010) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152). 
 29. 45 C.F.R. § 152.14(a)(1) (2010). 
 30. Id. § 152.2(4)(vi). 
 31. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(g) (2012) (implementing the premium tax credits); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 155.20 (2012) (implementing the Affordable Insurance Exchanges). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“lawfully present” was used to define eligibility for Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), which provide free or 
low-cost comprehensive health insurance for children under the age of 
twenty-one, pregnant women, and certain low-income individuals, 
including seniors and persons with disabilities.
32
  
Two years later, on June 15, 2012, President Obama announced a new 
policy called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which granted 
deferred action status to undocumented immigrants who had entered the 
United States as children, had lived here for at least five years, were below 
the age of thirty-one on that date, complied with certain educational 
requirements, and had not been convicted of certain crimes. A 
Memorandum issued by the Secretary of DHS that set forth these criteria 
described DACA as a form of prosecutorial discretion for young people 
who “lacked the intent to violate the law.”
33
 It explained that immigration 
laws should not be “blindly enforced without consideration given to the 
individual circumstances of each case” and were not “designed to remove 
productive young people to countries where they may not have lived or 
even speak the language.”
34
 In addition, the Memorandum recognized that 
“many of these young people have already contributed to our country in 
significant ways.”
35
 
Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 2012, HHS published an interim final 
regulation that amended the definition of “lawfully present” in 45 C.F.R. 
§ 152.2 to exclude DACA recipients.
36
 While the revised regulation still 
included the general category of individuals in deferred action status, it 
carved out an exception specifically excluding individuals who had 
obtained deferred action status through DACA.
37
 This change made 
DACA recipients ineligible for the PCIP, Affordable Insurance 
Exchanges, premium tax credits, and cost-sharing reductions, since all of 
these rely on the same definition of “lawfully present.”
38
 HHS explained 
 
 
 32. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Health 
Official (July 1, 2010), available at https://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/ 
downloads/SHO10006.pdf. 
 33. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us 
-as-children.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi), (8) (2016). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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that excluding DACA recipients from the PCIP would ensure that the 
interim final rule “does not inadvertently expand the scope of the DACA 
process.”
39
 According to HHS, it “would not be consistent with the 
reasons offered for adopting the DACA process to extend health insurance 
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act to these individuals.”
40
 HHS 
described DHS’s reason for adopting DACA as ensuring that enforcement 
efforts focus on high-priority cases.
41
  
HHS’s revised definition of “lawfully present” also excluded DACA 
recipients from obtaining affordable health insurance under the state 
option available in Medicaid and CHIP.
42
 The Children’s Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (“CHIPRA”) gives states the option 
of providing Medicaid or CHIP to children and/or pregnant women who 
are “lawfully residing” in the United States and otherwise meet the criteria 
for these benefits.
43
 The definition of “lawfully residing” tracks the 
definition of “lawfully present,” with the additional requirement that the 
individual establish residence in the state where she is applying for 
benefits.
44
 Thus, by excluding DACA recipients from the definition of 
“lawfully present,” the interim final rule also excluded them from the 
definition of “lawfully residing” for purposes of eligibility for Medicaid 
and CHIP. Once again, the only explanation offered by HHS in the interim 
final rule was that “the reasons that DHS offered for adopting the DACA 
process do not pertain to eligibility for Medicaid or CHIP.”
45
 HHS stated 
this same reason in a letter issued to State Health Officials and Medicaid 
Directors on August 28, 2012.
46
  
HHS made the amended interim final rule effective immediately, 
invoking a waiver of the usual notice and comment procedures for 
proposed rulemaking. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
provides an exception to notice and comment procedures where the agency 
 
 
 39. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,615 (Aug. 30, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397aa(a) (2014). 
 44. See Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 32, at 2. The regulations specify that residence 
means living in a state with the intent to remain there for an indefinite period. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403 
(2016). 
 45. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,615 (Aug. 30, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152). 
 46. Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Services, to State Health Official 
and Medicaid Director 1 (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-
Guidance/Downloads/SHO-12-002.pdf. 
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finds good cause that those procedures would be impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
47
 Here, HHS found that 
waiting for public comments to issue the regulation would be contrary to 
the public interest because the PCIP program was enrolling eligible 
individuals, and HHS thought it important to “provide clarity with respect 
to eligibility for this new and unforeseen group of individuals as soon as 
possible, before anyone with deferred action under the DACA process 
applies to enroll in the PCIP program.”
48
 Based on the same rationale, 
HHS applied the good cause exception to waiting at least thirty days after 
publication in the Federal Register for a final rule to become effective
49
 
and made the final rule effective immediately.
50
 
Although the regulation excluding DACA recipients was made 
effective immediately, HHS provided sixty days for public comments “on 
the implications of the amendment.”
51
 In response, HHS received over 
250 comments from legal organizations, health care providers, nonprofits 
that work with immigrants, and others, which overwhelmingly opposed 
the change.
52
 The main reasons given for opposition were that the 
exclusion of DACA recipients contradicted the purpose of the ACA, 
would lead to higher health insurance premiums for everyone, would 
increase health care costs, would send mixed messages to lawfully present 
immigrants, and would make arbitrary distinctions among individuals with 
the same legal status.
53
 Furthermore, at least one commentator, the 
 
 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2014). 
 48. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 52,616. 
 49. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3). 
 50. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 52,616. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp=50;po=0;s=CMS% 
25E2%2580%25939995%25E2%2580%2593IFC2;dct=PS (last visited May 13, 2016). 
 53. See, e.g., id.; Asian Am. Justice Ctr., Comments on CMS’ Interim Final Rule Changes to 
Definition of “Lawfully Present” in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program of the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0132; Alison Buist & Kathleen King, Children’s Def. Fund, 
Comments on CMS’ Interim Final Rule Changes to Definition of “Lawfully Present” in the Pre-
Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0118; Matt Ginsburg, 
AFL-CIO, Comments on Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52614 (Oct. 
29, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0170; 
Robin Goldfaden, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Comments on 
Changes by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services, 
to Interim Final Rule Definition of “Lawfully Present” in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan 
Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0209; Jennifer Ng’andu & Laura Vazquez, Nat’l Council of La 
Raza, Comments on CMS’ Interim Final Rule Changes to Definition of “Lawfully Present” in the Pre-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, challenged HHS’s 
reliance on the good cause exceptions to circumvent regular notice and 
comment procedures and make the regulation effective immediately.
54
 In 
December 2012, Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), joined by eighty 
members of Congress, sent a letter to President Obama asking him to 
reinstate health care for DACA recipients.
55
 
These calls for reform have not been successful. In fact, the Obama 
administration has taken pains to ensure that excluded categories of 
immigrants do not obtain insurance coverage under the Act. In September 
2014, the administration announced that it had cut off the ACA coverage 
of about 115,000 immigrants who had failed to provide proof that they 
were lawfully present in the country.
56
 Furthermore, in November 2014, 
when President Obama expanded the category of individuals eligible for 
DACA and created Deferred Action for undocumented immigrants who 
are the parents of US citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents, media 
reports indicated that these individuals would also be excluded from 
coverage under the ACA.
57
 As discussed below, these exclusions leave 
hundreds of thousands—and potentially millions—of individuals who are 
lawfully living and working in the United States without any health 
insurance. 
B. Impact of DACA and DAPA Policies 
To date, nearly 1.4 million individuals eligible for the original DACA 
program have applied.
58
 Approximately 1.2 million of these applications 
 
 
Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0203. 
 54. James A. Ferg-Cadima, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund (Oct. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0242. 
 55. Press Release, Rep. Barbara Lee, Letter to Obama: Reinstate Healthcare to DREAMers (Dec. 
18, 2012), available at https://lee.house.gov/news/press-releases/letter-to-obama-reinstate-healthcare-
to-dreamers. 
 56. Lena H. Sun, 115,000 Immigrants to Lose Health Coverage by Sept. 30 Because of Lack of 
Status Data, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/115000-immigrants-to-lose-health-coverage-by-sept-30-because-of-lack-of-status-data/2014/0 
9/15/f76be8e6-3d18-11e4-9587-5dafd96295f0_story.html. 
 57. See Jason Millman & Juliet Eilperin, Obama’s Order Won’t Extend Obamacare to 
Undocumented Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/11/19/obamas-order-wont-extend-obamacare-to-undocumented-immigrants/; Michael 
D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama’s Immigration Plan Could Shield Five Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/us/politics/obamacare-unlikely-for-undocumented-immig 
rants.html?_r=0. 
 58. USCIS DATA SET, supra note 14. 
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have been approved, and about sixty thousand remain pending.
59
 Many 
recipients are now filing their renewal applications, since DACA began in 
2012 and granted deferred action status for a period of two years. By the 
end of Fiscal Year 2015, US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) had received nearly 400,000 renewal applications.
60
 As a 
population, those who have applied for DACA are quite young and have 
strong ties to the United States. One-third of the applicants were between 
the ages of fifteen and eighteen, and another forty percent were between 
the ages of nineteen and twenty-three.
61
 Furthermore, nearly three-quarters 
of the applicants have lived in the United States for at least ten years, and 
one-third arrived at age five or younger.
62
  
In November 2014, the Department of Homeland Security announced 
an expanded DACA program, as well as a new program called Deferred 
Action for Parental Accountability.
63
 If implemented, the expanded 
DACA program would make about 330,000 additional immigrants eligible 
for deferred action status by eliminating the requirement that applicants be 
under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012, and requiring continuous 
residence in the United States since January 1, 2010, instead of June 15, 
2007.
64
 About one hundred thousand more people may become eligible for 
DACA over time by turning fifteen, which is the minimum age to apply, 
or by satisfying the education requirement (i.e., by enrolling in school or 
obtaining a high school diploma or GED).
65
 In addition, an estimated 3.7 
million immigrants would qualify for DAPA.
66
 This figure includes 3.53 
million parents of US citizens and 180,000 parents of legal permanent 
residents.
67
 Together, the expanded DACA and DAPA programs could 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Audrey Singer & Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Immigration Facts: Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
reports/2013/08/14-daca-immigration-singer, archived at https://perma.cc/UR3J-Z8MQ. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Jens Manual Krogstad & Ana Gonzales-Barrera, If Original DACA Program Is a Guide, 
Many Eligible Immigrants Will Apply for Deportation Relief, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/05/if-original-daca-program-is-a-guide-many-eligible- 
immigrants-will-apply-for-deportation-relief/, archived at https://perma.cc/BET5-LT7F; see also Press 
Release, Migration Policy Inst., As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief 
from Deportation Under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), available at 
http://migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-depor 
tation-under-anticipated-new [hereinafter Migration Policy Institute Press Release]. 
 65. See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 16. 
 66. Migration Policy Institute Press Release, supra note 64. 
 67. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS 1285 
 
 
 
 
allow 5.2 million undocumented immigrants—half of the estimated 
undocumented population—to live and work lawfully in the United States. 
Although the process of applying for deferred action under the 
expanded DACA program was expected to begin on February 18, 2015, a 
preliminary injunction issued by a federal district court judge in Texas and 
upheld by the Fifth Circuit has put the process on hold. The preliminary 
injunction is based on a lawsuit filed by twenty-six states challenging the 
DACA and DAPA programs as unlawful under the US Constitution’s 
Take Care Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act.
68
 In June 2016, 
an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
a one-sentence per curiam decision.
69
 The fate of these recent programs 
remains uncertain, since the appeal concerned only a preliminary 
injunction, and a final judgment in the case—which may ultimately be 
reviewed by a full complement of Justices—has not yet been issued. 
Regardless of what happens with the expanded DACA and DAPA 
programs, however, there has been no legal challenge to the original 
DACA program. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the recent lawsuit, the 
exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA remains an important 
concern. Of course, if an appellate court upholds the expanded DACA and 
DAPA programs, then over five million people will be authorized to live 
and work in the United States but excluded from affordable health care 
under the ACA.  
C. Health Care Options for DACA Recipients  
In order to assess the impact of exclusion from the ACA, it is important 
to understand what other health care options are available to DACA 
recipients. One option is to obtain health insurance through an employer. 
Nothing prevents DACA recipients from obtaining health insurance in this 
way, since they can receive an employment authorization document that 
enables them to obtain a valid social security number. A significant 
fraction of DACA recipients, however, will not have access to employer-
based health insurance, given the statistics for their age group and 
individuals of Hispanic race.
70
 Even DACA recipients who are lucky 
 
 
 68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 69. United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam). 
 70. Young people in the age group of most DACA recipients (fifteen to twenty-five) are less 
likely to be engaged in employment that offers health insurance. According to 2010 census data, forty-
three percent of individuals aged fifteen to eighteen and sixty percent of those aged nineteen to twenty-
five were offered health insurance by an employer, compared to three-quarters of individuals aged 
twenty-six to sixty-four. HUBERT JANICKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
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enough to have employment-based insurance now may become uninsured 
in the future, as the availability of employer-based health insurance 
declines.
71
  
Another option for those excluded from the ACA is to rely on the so-
called “safety net” of health care providers, which includes a patchwork of 
public hospitals, community health centers, local health departments, rural 
clinics, special service providers, and private physicians who provide 
charity care.
72
 There are several reasons why these safety net providers are 
unlikely to be able to meet the health needs of those excluded from the 
ACA. First, safety-net providers remain under enormous financial strain.
73
 
Many states faced with budget deficits have cut spending on Medicaid, 
which is the primary source of funding for safety-net providers.
74
 At the 
same time, the demand for safety-net services has increased significantly 
over the past decade.
75
 In addition, huge geographical variations exist in 
the strength of safety nets.
76
  
 
 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 2 (2013). 
Furthermore, census data indicate that only fifty-six percent of Hispanics were offered insurance 
through an employer in 2010, compared to about three-quarters of Whites and Blacks. Id. at 6. Among 
those offered employer-based insurance, many do not enroll because they cannot afford it. Id. at 13. 
While Hispanics constitute nineteen percent of the population, they represent thirty-four percent of the 
uninsured. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/, archived at https://perma 
.cc/K6TH-HPGU. Among Hispanic noncitizens, half are uninsured. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark 
Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Immigrants More Likely to Lack Health Insurance Than U.S.-Born, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/26/higher-share-of-
hispanic-immigrants-than-u-s-born-lack-health-insurance/, archived at https://perma.cc/T29F-38AC. 
 71. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Envisioning the End of Employer-Provided Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/upshot/employer-sponsored-health-insurance-
may-be-on-the-way-out.html?_r=0. One study predicts that by 2020, the overwhelming majority of 
workers who now receive health insurance through their employers will move to insurance obtained 
through ACA Marketplaces. See S&P CAPITAL IQ, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT COULD SHIFT 
HEALTH CARE BENEFIT RESPONSIBILITY AWAY FROM EMPLOYERS, POTENTIALLY SAVING S&P 500 
COMPANIES $700 BILLION 8 (2014). 
 72. The Institute of Medicine has defined the safety net as health care providers that have a legal 
mandate or mission of providing health care to patients regardless of their ability to pay and that treat a 
substantial share of patients who are uninsured, on Medicaid, or otherwise vulnerable. INST. OF MED., 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 1 (2000). 
 73. See Irwin Redlener & Roy Grant, America’s Safety Net and Health Care Reform—What Lies 
Ahead?, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2201, 2202 (2009). 
 74. ACAD. HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE SAFETY NET 2–3 
(2011). 
 75. Id. 
 76. INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 2. Sixty-five million people live in federally designated 
Health Professional Shortage Areas, many of which have no health center whatsoever; and those that 
do have health centers may provide only limited services. Redlener & Grant, supra note 73, at 2202. 
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The ACA will make health insurance available to some groups that 
previously relied on safety-net providers.
77
 Yet an estimated 23 million 
people will remain uninsured, either because they are excluded from the 
mandate or because they decide to pay a penalty instead of purchasing 
insurance.
78
 Safety-net providers are concerned about their ability to treat 
this large uninsured population, in part because they are losing funding 
through the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DSH”) program, 
which began being phased out in 2014.
79
 Safety-net providers worry that 
“[t]hey may lose more in DSH payments than they will gain in other 
revenue.”
80
 In addition, patients may turn to safety-net providers for 
services that are not covered by their insurance plans.
81
  
Finally, DACA recipients excluded from the ACA could potentially 
obtain care in emergency rooms. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), hospitals are required to provide emergency 
care regardless of immigration status or ability to pay.
82
 However, 
emergency care in this country remains in a dismal state. For the past 
twenty years, the rate of emergency room visits has increased at twice the 
rate of growth of the US population.
83
 In 2014, the American College of 
Emergency Physicians (“ACEP”) gave a grade of “D+” to the overall 
environment in which the emergency care system operates.
84
 ACEP 
reports that this near-failing grade “reflects trouble for a nation that has too 
few emergency departments to meet the needs of a growing, aging 
population, and of the increasing number of people now insured as a result 
of the Affordable Care Act.”
85
  
 
 
 77. For example, the expansion of the Medicaid program to cover individuals with income up to 
133 percent of the federal poverty level will create a payment source for patients who were previously 
uninsured. Other formerly uninsured patients will be able to purchase insurance through the premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies that are now available to families with incomes between 100 and 400 
percent of the federal poverty level. These individuals may no longer need to use safety-net providers, 
or they may be able to pay safety-net providers through their new insurance. See ACAD. HEALTH, 
supra note 74, at 3. 
 78. Id. at 4. In 2015, uninsured individuals were expected to represent twenty-two percent of 
health center patients. Id. 
 79. Id. This program gives money to states to subsidize certain hospitals that incur unreimbursed 
costs related to treating uninsured and Medicaid patients. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 4–5. In particular, safety-net providers fear that increased demand for specialty 
services, such as mental health care, will strain their capacity. Id. at 5. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2014). 
 83. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, AMERICA’S EMERGENCY CARE ENVIRONMENT: A 
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD, at v (2014) [hereinafter ACEP STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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Although one of the selling points of the ACA was its potential to 
reduce emergency room visits, the opposite has actually happened. A 2014 
survey shows that nearly half of emergency room physicians reported an 
increase in the number of patients since the ACA went into effect, and the 
vast majority (86 percent) expected the number to increase over the next 
three years.
86
 One reason for this increase is that the millions of people 
who became eligible for Medicaid under the ACA cannot find physicians 
who will accept their insurance and therefore go to the emergency room 
for treatment instead.
87
 Most emergency room physicians do not think 
their departments are equipped to handle this increase, and only one-third 
believe the ACA will have a positive long-term impact on access to 
emergency care.
88
  
The obstacles to accessing both employment-based health insurance 
and safety-net providers, including emergency rooms, suggest that a 
substantial portion of DACA recipients will be unable to access any kind 
of affordable health care if kept out of the insurance programs under the 
ACA. Determining whether their exclusion from the ACA comports with 
the Equal Protection Clause is therefore a pressing legal issue. 
II. SCRUTINIZING STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ALIENAGE 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”
89
 In 1886, the Supreme Court held that this 
provision applies “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without 
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”
90
 Nearly 
seventy years later, on the same day that it decided Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the 
federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 
since “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”
91
 In the immigration context, 
 
 
 86. MKTG. GEN., INC., 2014 ACEP POLLING SURVEY RESULTS 6, 9 (2014) [hereinafter ACEP 
POLLING SURVEY RESULTS]. 
 87. ACEP STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 88. ACEP POLLING SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 86, at 10. 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 90. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (invalidating San Francisco’s denial of 
permits to Chinese laundry operators). 
 91. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in District of 
Columbia public schools violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Brown v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS 1289 
 
 
 
 
however, the Court has held that the Constitution does impose a lesser 
duty on the federal government.
92
 While alienage-based classifications by 
states are generally subject to strict scrutiny, federal classifications usually 
receive only rational basis review.
93
 The deference given to the federal 
government stems from the plenary power doctrine, which ties the federal 
immigration power to foreign affairs and national security, issues largely 
immune from judicial review.
94
 
With respect to both state and federal classifications, however, 
significant questions that bear on the appropriate standard of review 
remain unanswered to this day. Regarding state classifications, there is 
currently a circuit split about whether strict scrutiny is limited to legal 
permanent residents (“LPRs”) or extends to others who are lawfully 
present. With respect to federal classifications, the division of immigration 
authority between Congress and the President remains unclear, as 
evidenced by the pending litigation challenging the legality of the DACA 
and DAPA policies. Furthermore, the allocation of immigration authority 
within the executive branch has remained largely unexamined by courts 
and scholars alike, yet is highly relevant to assessing alienage-based 
classifications made by executive agencies. Another layer of complexity 
emerges when federal and state programs are entangled; courts have sliced 
this type of “Gordian knot” in conflicting ways.
95
 These lacunae in the 
legal landscape of alienage-based classifications are all relevant to 
analyzing whether the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA 
 
 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 92. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85–86 (1976) (applying rational basis review to welfare rules 
that treated legal permanent residents and citizens differently). 
 93. Compare Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85–86 (applying rational basis review to federal welfare rules 
that treated legal permanent residents and citizens differently), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 375–76 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to state welfare rules that treated legal permanent 
residents and citizens differently). There is an exception to the general rule that state-made 
classifications receive strict scrutiny when a state excludes noncitizens from participation in its 
democratic political institutions. In that situation, only rational basis review applies. See Cabell v. 
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (“The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes 
is . . . a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition.”); Ambach v. 
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73–74 (1979) (“[S]ome state functions are so bound up with the operation of 
the State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who 
have not become part of the process of self-government.”); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 
(1973) (recognizing “a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic 
political institutions”). 
 94. See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
 95. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (2014) (“[T]his case presents a Gordian knot of federal 
and state legislation effecting an adverse impact on resident aliens . . . .”). 
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violates equal protection. This Part therefore addresses each of them in 
turn. 
A. Discrimination by States 
1. Strict Scrutiny for Legal Permanent Residents 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Graham v. Richardson, 
alienage-based classifications made by states are normally subject to strict 
scrutiny, which requires showing that the classification is necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest.
96
 In Graham, the Court 
examined two state statutes that denied welfare benefits to LPRs.
97
 One 
statute made permanent residents ineligible for these benefits, while the 
other imposed a fifteen-year residency requirement for them to qualify.
98
 
For the first time, the Court found that “classifications based on alienage, 
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject 
to close judicial scrutiny,” as “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate.”
99
 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court struck 
down both statutes as violations of the Equal Protection Clause, explaining 
that “a State’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own 
citizens is inadequate to justify . . . making noncitizens ineligible.”
100
 
Since Graham, the Court has repeatedly found that state laws treating 
citizens and noncitizens differently violate equal protection under strict 
scrutiny review.
101
 
 
 
 96. Graham, 403 U.S. at 375–76; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 
413, 420, 422 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a California statute that targeted individuals of 
Japanese descent by barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons “ineligible to citizenship” and 
explaining that “the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is 
confined within narrow limits”). 
 97. Graham, 403 U.S. at 366–68. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938)). 
 100. Id. at 374. 
 101. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 217–18 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to 
invalidate a Texas statute that required notaries public to be US citizens); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, 
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to state 
restrictions on civil engineering licenses); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 717–29 (1973) (applying strict 
scrutiny to invalidate a Connecticut statute excluding aliens from being licensed as attorneys); 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (holding that the state’s exclusion of aliens from civil 
service jobs denied them equal protection); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a New York statute that prohibited nonimmigrants with 
temporary work visas from obtaining a pharmacist’s license). 
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State statutes that discriminate among noncitizens likewise are 
considered classifications based on alienage and subject to strict 
scrutiny.
102
 In Nyquist v. Mauclet, the Supreme Court considered a New 
York statute that imposed alienage-based restrictions on eligibility for 
state financial assistance for higher education.
103
 To qualify, a student had 
to be a US citizen, an LPR with a pending application for citizenship, an 
LPR who was not yet qualified to apply for citizenship but who pledged to 
apply as soon as possible, or someone paroled into the United States as a 
refugee.
104
 The statute was challenged on equal protection grounds by two 
LPRs who did not wish to become US citizens.
105
 In defending the 
constitutionality of the statute, the state argued that “the statute 
distinguishe[d] only within the heterogeneous class of aliens and [did] not 
distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non.”
106
 According to the state, 
“[o]nly statutory classifications of the latter type . . . warrant strict 
scrutiny.”
107
 The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Arizona 
statute at issue in Graham “served to discriminate only within the class of 
aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled 
to welfare benefits.”
108
 In Nyquist, the Court stressed that “[t]he important 
points are that [the statute] is directed at aliens and that only aliens are 
harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean 
that it does not discriminate against the class.”
109
 Since both of the 
appellees in the case were LPRs, the Court did not specifically address the 
issue of whether a state statute that harmed only non-LPRs would be 
constitutional.  
 
 
 102. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a New 
York statute that limited financial aid for higher education to citizens, those who had applied for 
citizenship, and those who declared an intent to apply when they became eligible); Graham, 403 U.S. 
at 371–74 (applying strict scrutiny to an Arizona statute that required fifteen years of residence in the 
United States for noncitizens to qualify for benefits but had no residency requirement for US citizens). 
 103. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 2–4. 
 104. Id. at 3–4. 
 105. Id. at 4–6. 
 106. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 8–9. 
 109. Id. at 9. 
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Nor has the Supreme Court addressed this issue in any subsequent 
cases. While the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the standard 
of review for state laws that discriminate against individuals who have 
only temporary visas (as opposed to permanent residency) in Toll v. 
Moreno, it declined to do so.
110
 There, the Court was asked to decide the 
constitutionality of a Maryland law that denied in-state tuition to 
individuals with G-4 visas, which are issued to the immediate family 
members of employees of international organizations.
111
 The Court 
invalidated the law as preempted by Congress’s detailed scheme for G-4 
visa holders and therefore did not consider the equal protection issue.
112
  
Consequently, although the Supreme Court has not distinguished 
among categories of lawfully present noncitizens in applying strict 
scrutiny to state laws, a circuit split has emerged on what standard of 
review applies to non-LPRs. 
2. Circuit Split for Non-Legal Permanent Residents 
The only distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in standards of 
scrutiny has been between individuals who are lawfully present and those 
who are undocumented. While the Court has applied strict scrutiny to the 
former, it indicated that rational basis review applies to the latter in Plyler 
v. Doe, which involved a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented 
children from attending public schools.
113
 In Plyler, the Court found that 
undocumented children did not constitute a suspect class, reasoning that 
they fell outside of Graham’s reach because “their presence in this country 
in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”
114
  
 
 
 110. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). This case was decided the same month as Plyler v. Doe, a 
seminal decision striking down as unconstitutional a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented 
children from attending school. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 111. Toll, 458 U.S. at 3. 
 112. Id. at 17. Some commentators have suggested that the occupational licensing cases discussed 
above should also have been resolved through the preemption doctrine, since the federal immigration 
statute and regulations include relevant language about work authorization and licensing. See Jennesa 
Calvo-Friedman, Note, The Uncertain Terrain of State Occupational Licensing Laws for Noncitizens: 
A Preemption Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1597, 1621–22 (2014) (arguing that state laws barring 
nonimmigrants from certain licensed occupations undermine 8 U.S.C. § 1601, which emphasizes the 
need for noncitizens to be self-sufficient and rely on their own capabilities); Justin Storch, Legal 
Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 15 (2011) 
(discussing the relevance of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A), which addresses state licensure as a 
requirement for obtaining a nonimmigrant visa with H-classification). 
 113. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 114. Id. at 223. 
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Although the Court purported to apply rational basis review in Plyler, it 
struck down the Texas statute under a heightened level of scrutiny.
115
 The 
Court explained:  
In determining the rationality of [the Texas statute], we may 
appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the 
innocent children who are its victims. In light of these 
countervailing costs, the discrimination . . . can hardly be 
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the 
State.
116
 
The Court went on to find that the classification excluding undocumented 
children was unjustified by the State’s interests in preserving resources, 
protecting itself against an influx of undocumented immigrants, providing 
high-quality education, or educating only those children likely to remain 
within its borders.
117
 Since the classification did not further any 
substantial state interest, the Court concluded that denying “a discrete 
group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other 
children” violated the Equal Protection Clause.
118
 
Some federal appellate courts have gone further by restricting the 
application of strict scrutiny to state laws that discriminate against LPRs. 
Conflicting interpretations of Supreme Court precedents have resulted in a 
circuit split about whether strict scrutiny applies to nonimmigrants, a 
technical term for individuals who have temporary visas, not permanent 
residency. Nonimmigrant visas are granted for specific purposes and 
limited periods of time.
119
 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that 
rational basis review applies to nonimmigrants, whereas the Second 
Circuit has held that strict scrutiny applies to all lawfully present 
 
 
 115. Id. at 220 (“It is . . . difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these 
children for their presence within the United States.”); id. at 223–24 (examining the “rationality” of the 
Texas statute and whether it “furthers some substantial goal of the State”). Justice Powell’s 
concurrence noted that “review in a case such as [this] is properly heightened.” Id. at 238 & n.2 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
 116. Id. at 223–24 (majority opinion). 
 117. Id. at 227–30. 
 118. Id. at 230. 
 119. Examples of nonimmigrant visas include tourist visas, temporary work visas, student visas, 
investor visas, and visas for entertainers or athletes. 
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noncitizens.
120
 The Ninth Circuit has also implicitly found that strict 
scrutiny applies to nonimmigrants.
121
 
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit applied rational basis review to a 
Louisiana Supreme Court rule that required applicants for admission to the 
Louisiana State Bar to be citizens or LPRs.
122
 The court construed 
Supreme Court decisions such as Graham as justifying strict scrutiny 
based on two conditions specific to LPRs: (1) their similarity to citizens in 
their economic, social, and civic conditions; and (2) their inability to exert 
political power, despite this similarity.
123
 The court then distinguished 
nonimmigrants on the basis that they are not “entrenched” in society like 
LPRs, their lack of political power is “tied to their temporary connection 
to this country,” and “the numerous variations among nonimmigrant 
aliens’ admission status make it inaccurate to describe them as a class that 
is ‘discrete’ or ‘insular.’”
124
 The court therefore rejected arguments that 
nonimmigrants constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and applied only 
rational basis review.
125
 Judge Higginbotham, who dissented from the 
court’s denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, cautioned that “judicially 
crafting a subset of aliens, scaled by how it perceives the aliens’ proximity 
to citizenship . . . . is a bold step not sanctioned by Supreme Court 
precedent.”
126
 
In a 2011 decision, Van Staden v. St. Martin, the Fifth Circuit relied on 
LeClerc in applying rational basis review to uphold a Louisiana rule 
restricting nursing licenses to permanent residents and citizens.
127
 In that 
case, the appellant was a citizen of South Africa who had lived in the 
United States since 2001 and was a licensed practical nurse in Texas.
128
 
When she moved to Louisiana in 2007, she was denied a nursing license 
based solely on her immigration status, although that status authorized her 
to work as a nurse in the United States.
129
 Van Staden applied for 
 
 
 120. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 72–74 (2d Cir. 2012); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 530–36 (6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420–21 
(5th Cir. 2005). 
 121. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014) (involving nonimmigrants residing in 
Hawaii under the Compact of Free Association with the United States). 
 122. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 420. 
 123. Id. at 417. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 417–20. 
 126. LeClerc v. Webb, 444 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 2006) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 127. Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 57–62 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 128. Id. at 57. 
 129. Id. 
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permanent resident status, but the Fifth Circuit found that a pending 
application was not enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
130
 The court held that 
“LeClerc draws a clean line between permanent resident aliens and 
nonimmigrant aliens,” and that LPR applicants like Van Staden “fall into 
the latter category, even if close to the former.”
131
 
The Sixth Circuit followed in the Fifth Circuit’s footsteps in applying 
rational basis review to a Tennessee law that required proof of US 
citizenship or permanent resident status to obtain a driver’s license.
132
 The 
Sixth Circuit distinguished Nyquist, where the Supreme Court had applied 
strict scrutiny to a New York law that denied state financial assistance for 
higher education to nonimmigrants as well as LPRs, primarily on the basis 
that both of the plaintiffs in that case were LPRs.
133
 The court then 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in LeClerc, distinguishing 
nonimmigrants from LPRs on the basis that they “are admitted to the 
United States only for the duration of their authorized status, are not 
permitted to serve in the U.S. military, are subject to strict employment 
restrictions, incur differential tax treatment, and may be denied federal 
welfare benefits.”
134
 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gilman advocated 
“taking the Supreme Court at its word when it reaffirmed in Graham that 
‘classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny.’”
135
 
The Second Circuit has completely rejected the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis.
136
 In Dandamudi v. Tisch, the Second Circuit explained 
that the Supreme Court had never used proximity to citizenship as a test 
for determining whether a given group of noncitizens should be 
considered a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny.
137
 Furthermore, the 
Second Circuit found that “the Supreme Court recognizes aliens generally 
as a discrete and insular minority without significant political clout.”
138
 
The court also reasoned that even if the appropriate level of scrutiny did 
depend on the noncitizens’ proximity to citizenship, it would still apply 
strict scrutiny because nonimmigrants pay taxes, are sometimes allowed to 
 
 
 130. Id. at 60–61. 
 131. Id. at 59. 
 132. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 533. 
 135. Id. at 542 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 
(1971)). 
 136. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75–79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 137. Id. at 75–77. 
 138. Id. at 75. 
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have the intent of remaining permanently in the United States, and were 
authorized by the federal government to work in the very occupation from 
which New York was excluding them.
139
 The court noted that 
nonimmigrants often remain in the United States for many years and 
frequently become LPRs.
140
 Finally, the Second Circuit found that 
applying rational basis review to nonimmigrants would create absurd 
results, since the Supreme Court had applied heightened rational basis 
review to undocumented children in Plyler.
141
 
While the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed this issue like the 
Second Circuit, it has implicitly indicated that strict scrutiny would apply 
to nonimmigrants subjected to discriminatory state laws. In Korab v. Fink, 
the court considered whether nonimmigrants residing in Hawaii under a 
Compact of Free Association with the United States (“COFA residents”) 
could be excluded from state-funded health care benefits pursuant to the 
Welfare Reform Act of 1996.
142
 The focus of the court in that case was 
whether to categorize the discrimination as state or federal, since that 
would dictate the standard of review.
143
 At no point did the court suggest 
that the nonimmigrant status of the COFA residents triggered rational 
basis review. If that were the case, the court could have resolved the case 
without analyzing a complex, hybrid statute.
144
 
A lacuna in the law remains not only regarding the standard of review 
for nonimmigrants, but also for individuals who are authorized to be in the 
country but do not have a legal status. This group includes, among others, 
noncitizens with deferred action status or temporary protected status, 
individuals who have been paroled into the United States or who have 
pending applications for various forms of relief (such as asylum and 
cancellation of removal), and noncitizens granted withholding of removal 
or protection under the Convention Against Torture based on a risk of 
persecution or torture in their home countries. All of these individuals are 
lawfully present in the United States, as they have authorization to be here 
for at least a temporary period of time, do not accrue “unlawful presence,” 
and are eligible to apply for work authorization.
145
 For some of these 
 
 
 139. Id. at 77. 
 140. Id. at 78. 
 141. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982)). 
 142. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 143. Id. at 580–84. 
 144. See id. at 585 (Bybee, J., concurring). 
 145. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2016) (describing classes of aliens authorized to accept 
employment); Interoffice Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic 
Operations Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al., to Field Leadership (May 6, 
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categories, the individual may be authorized to remain in the United States 
even after a deportation order is issued. For example, when a noncitizen is 
granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention 
Against Torture, a deportation order is issued, but the deportation is 
withheld indefinitely. Similarly, individuals who are ordered deported but 
obtain a stay of removal may be granted deferred action status for a 
temporary period. 
So far, only the Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to consider what 
standard of review applies to these categories of noncitizens with “less” 
than nonimmigrant status. In a recent case, the court considered the 
constitutionality of an Arizona statute that prohibited DACA recipients 
from using their work permits as evidence of their lawful presence in the 
United States, while allowing similarly situated individuals with pending 
applications for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to do 
so.
146
 In reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court found 
that the equal protection claim would likely succeed.
147
 However, it did 
not decide if the standard of review is strict scrutiny or rational basis or 
something in between, because it found that Arizona’s law would not even 
survive the rational basis test.
148
 Thus, courts have yet to weigh in on the 
proper standard of review for equal protection claims involving 
noncitizens with deferred action status or other types of authorized periods 
of stay that do not amount to a visa of any kind. 
B. Discrimination by the Federal Government 
1. Rational Basis Review and the Plenary Power  
Although alienage-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny 
when made by states, at least if they affect LPRs, such classifications 
receive great deference when made by the federal government due to the 
plenary power doctrine.
149
 The Court has held that Congress possesses 
plenary power over immigration based on its constitutional authority to 
 
 
2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_ 
Memoranda/2009/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF.  
 146. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1063–67 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1065–67. 
 149. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 853–54 (1987); see also generally Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 
255 (arguing that the Court has been unusually deferential in the area of immigration). 
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establish a “Uniform Rule of Naturalization” and “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations.”
150
 While the plenary power doctrine was initially 
articulated in a case upholding the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the 
United States, the Court has found that it extends far beyond the admission 
and exclusion of immigrants, giving Congress power over almost all 
aspects of noncitizens’ lives.
151
 During the early part of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court discussed the plenary power only in relation to 
Congress.
152
 Subsequent decisions, however, have explicitly extended the 
plenary power to the President, based on the President’s inherent authority 
over foreign affairs, which derives from the authority “to make Treaties,” 
to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls,” and to 
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”
153
 The Court has also 
found that the power to exclude noncitizens is inherent to national 
sovereignty.
154
  
While the plenary power is quite broad, it does not render government 
action completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court has 
 
 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3–4; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (noting that 
Congress has “broad power over naturalization and immigration”); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 
354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”), 
superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3445, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 588–90 (2011); Takahashi v. 
Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 713 (1893)) (“The authority to control immigration . . . is vested solely in the Federal 
government.”). 
 151. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s 
Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 53–73 (1998); Legomsky, supra note 149, at 255–60; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 545, 549 (1990). 
 152. E.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932) 
(“Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, control of the admission of aliens is committed 
exclusively to Congress . . . .”); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914) (“The authority of 
Congress over the general subject-matter is plenary; it may exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the 
terms and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this country.”); Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (“[O]ver no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [immigration].”). 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 (referring 
to the “narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of 
immigration”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion 
of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power 
but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”); United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing “the very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress”). 
 154. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
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acknowledged its limits in cases dating back at least one hundred years.
155
 
In Knauff, the Court recognized that judicial review remains available for 
constitutional and statutory claims.
156
 The Court’s language in Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, which involved the Attorney General’s discretionary decision 
to deny a waiver of inadmissibility, further found that the Executive did 
not have “unfettered discretion.”
157
 There, the Court reviewed the decision 
to ensure that there was a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for the 
agency’s exercise of discretion.
158
 
In Mathews v. Diaz, decided a few years later, the Court explicitly 
applied rational basis review to alienage-based classifications by the 
federal government.
159
 Diaz upheld distinctions based on alienage in the 
federal Medicare statute, which required legal permanent residents, but not 
citizens, to satisfy a five-year residency requirement to qualify for certain 
benefits.
160
 Due to the “narrow standard of review of decisions made by 
the Congress or the President in the area of immigration,” the Court found 
that Congress is allowed to enact laws that treat citizens and noncitizens 
differently, as long as those laws are rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.
161
 Accordingly, the Court found it “unquestionably 
reasonable for Congress to make an alien’s [benefit] eligibility depend on 
both the character and the duration of his residence.”
162
 Since Diaz, 
federal appellate courts have repeatedly upheld alienage classifications in 
federal statutes pertaining to benefits under rational basis review.
163
 Only 
 
 
 155. See, e.g., Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915) (“[W]hen the record shows that a 
commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas 
corpus.”); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (reasoning that even though the political 
branches have plenary power, a noncitizen denied entry into the United States “is doubtless entitled to 
a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful”). 
 156. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543–46 (rejecting the petitioner’s claims that the regulations were 
unreasonable or that the War Brides Act required a hearing, and acknowledging that the Attorney 
General had acted pursuant to valid regulations); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 
(2001) (noting that the plenary power “is subject to important constitutional limitations”); INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 311 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that judicial review is 
available “as a means of reviewing the legality of [the order of removal]” even where the statute 
“preclud[es] judicial review to the maximum extent possible under the Constitution”). 
 157. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972). 
 158. Id. 
 159. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 160. Id. at 79–87. 
 161. Id. at 81–89. 
 162. Id. at 82–83. 
 163. E.g., Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582–84 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding Welfare Reform 
Act restrictions on alien eligibility for state-administered prenatal Medicaid benefits); Aleman v. 
Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197–1204 (9th Cir. 2000) (same for food stamps); City of Chicago v. 
Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 603–09 (7th Cir. 1999) (same for supplemental security income (“SSI”) and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1300 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1271 
 
 
 
 
in a handful of cases have courts invalidated federal government action 
pertaining to immigration as irrational.
164
 
2. Allocation of Power Between Congress and the President 
Although the plenary power applies to both Congress and the 
President, the precise allocation of power between the legislative and 
executive branches remains far from clear.
165
 Despite the development of 
a detailed Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Presidents have 
exercised significant control over immigration.
166
 Primarily, the Executive 
exercises power over immigration through prosecutorial discretion 
regarding whom to deport, which means that the President’s power is 
“almost entirely at the back end of the system.”
167
  
President Obama, through the Secretary of DHS, presented the 
expanded DACA and DAPA policies as an exercise of such prosecutorial 
discretion on a large scale.
168
 Cases such as Heckler v. Chaney indicate 
that an agency’s decision about whether to exercise its enforcement 
authority, or to exercise it in a particular way, is largely immune from 
judicial review.
169
 Yet a lawsuit brought by twenty-six states is currently 
challenging the President’s authority to implement expanded DACA and 
DAPA.
170
 The states counter Chaney with Youngstown, where Justice 
Jackson famously set forth a three-part framework for analyzing deference 
 
 
food stamps); Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1346–53 (11th Cir. 1999) (same for SSI and 
food stamps). 
 164. Some examples of cases where the Court actually struck down a federal alienage-based 
classification under rational basis review include: Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(striking down under rational basis review a statute that permitted discretionary relief to those seeking 
to enter the country but not to those already here), superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, as recognized in 
Villalva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 591 F. App’x 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2014); Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1412–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding a classification irrational that conferred 
citizenship on the children of some male citizens but not on the children of similarly situated female 
citizens); Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 488–91 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (same); see also Chin, 
supra note 151, at 53–73 (arguing that racial discrimination in immigration laws would not now be 
permitted under the rational basis standard). 
 165. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 
458 (2009). 
 166. See id. at 485–91. 
 167. Id. at 519. 
 168. Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6. 
 169. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 607 (1985) (“[T]he Government’s enforcement priorities, and . . . the Government’s overall 
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 
undertake.”). 
 170. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS 1301 
 
 
 
 
to executive power.
171
 Under that framework, “[w]hen the President takes 
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb.”
172
  
The district court judge who issued a temporary preliminary injunction 
in February 2015 halting the expanded DACA and DAPA policies agreed 
with the states that Chaney did not govern.
173
 The court found that Chaney 
applies to agency inaction, but that DAPA constitutes affirmative agency 
action.
174
 Specifically, the court found that DAPA “awards legal presence 
. . . as well as the ability to obtain Social Security numbers, work 
authorization permits, and the ability to travel.”
175
 In addition, the district 
court in Texas found that there was no specific statute authorizing 
expanded DACA and DAPA, noting that the President announced it was 
Congress’s failure to pass a law that had prompted him to “change the 
law.”
176
 In fact, the court found that expanded DACA and DAPA 
“contradict[] Congress’ statutory goals.”
177
 In stating that “the discretion 
given to the DHS Secretary is not unlimited,”
178
 the decision calls into 
question the precise reach of the President’s supposedly plenary power 
over immigration and where the line between executive and legislative 
power should be drawn. 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this reasoning, finding that “[d]eferred 
action . . . is much more than non-enforcement,” and that the expanded 
DACA and DAPA policies exceeded the discretionary authority given to 
 
 
 171. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 172. Id. at 637–38; see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) (“Justice Jackson’s concurrence 
outlined the three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation of powers . . . .”). 
 173. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 174. Id. at 654. 
 175. Id.; see also id. at 658–59. Similarly, an earlier decision by a federal district court judge in 
Pennsylvania had held, in a case involving a single individual, that the President’s DACA and DAPA 
programs went “beyond prosecutorial discretion” and amounted to legislation by establishing a 
relatively rigid framework for considering applications for deferred action. United States v. Juarez-
Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 786–88 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see also John C. Eastman, From Plyler to 
Arizona: Have the Courts Forgotten About Corfield v. Coryell?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 187 (2013) 
(stating that the President’s enforcement discretion cannot involve a “comprehensive and sweeping 
immigration scheme” that contravenes the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 176. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 657 & n.71 (quoting Press Release, The White House Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Immigration—Chicago, IL (Nov. 25, 2014)); see also id. at 
661 (“[N]o statute gives the DHS the discretion it is trying to exercise here.”). 
 177. Id. at 663. 
 178. Id. at 660. 
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DHS.
179
 The court found that the Secretary of DHS’s interpretation of the 
INA’s provisions “would allow him to grant lawful presence and work 
authorization to any illegal alien in the United States—an untenable 
position in light of the INA’s intricate system of immigration 
classifications and employment eligibility.”
180
 The court further explained 
that “[e]ven with ‘special deference’ to the Secretary, the INA flatly does 
not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully 
present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and 
state benefits, including work authorization.”
181
 According to the court, 
broad grants of authority in the INA “cannot reasonably be construed as 
assigning decisions of vast economic and political significance, such as 
DAPA, to an agency.”
182
 The detailed dissenting opinion by Judge King 
challenged this reasoning, concluding that deferred action is a 
presumptively unreviewable brand of prosecutorial discretion.
183
 This case 
highlights deeply contested areas in the allocation of immigration power 
between Congress and the executive branch that will eventually need to be 
resolved by a full complement of the Supreme Court.
184
 
3. Allocation of Power Within the Executive Branch 
Not only is the allocation of immigration authority between the two 
political branches of government unclear, but so is the allocation of that 
power within the executive branch, which remains largely unexplored by 
courts and scholars alike. There is no doubt that alienage-based 
classifications made by the executive agency with direct responsibility 
over immigration, the Department of Homeland Security, would receive 
only rational basis review. But what if Congress delegates the authority to 
make alienage-based classifications to another agency that has no 
 
 
 179. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 
(2016).  
 180. Id. at 184. 
 181. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 182. Id. at 183 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching this conclusion, 
the majority relied, in part, on King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“Whether those [tax] credits are available on Federal Exchanges [under the ACA] is thus a 
question of deep economic and political significance that is central to this statutory scheme; had 
Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”). See 
Texas, 809 F.3d at 181–82. 
 183. Texas, 809 F.3d at 218 (King, J., dissenting). 
 184. As mentioned above, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in a one-sentence per curiam decision. See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 
23, 2016) (per curiam). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS 1303 
 
 
 
 
immigration expertise, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Social 
Security Administration, or the Department of Transportation? 
The only Supreme Court case that addresses this issue has been rightly 
described as “opaque.”
185
 In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, which was 
decided the same day as Mathews v. Diaz, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a regulation issued by the US Civil Service 
Commission that excluded all persons except US citizens and natives of 
American Samoa from employment in most positions of federal service.
186
 
One thing that Mow Sun Wong made clear is that the powers Congress and 
the President have over immigration do not mean that any federal entity 
automatically evades judicial scrutiny in creating classifications based on 
alienage. The Court expressly rejected the argument that “the federal 
power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government 
may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules 
from those applied to citizens.”
187
  
The Court explained that “[w]hen the Federal Government asserts an 
overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due 
process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule 
was actually intended to serve that interest.”
188
 In determining whether an 
agency’s regulation was intended to serve an overriding national interest, 
the Court set forth two alternative tests: (1) whether the agency had direct 
responsibility over immigration; and (2) whether the agency had an 
express mandate from Congress or the President.
189
 
First, the Court examined whether the agency that promulgated the rule 
had “direct responsibility for fostering or protecting” the overriding 
national interest.
190
 The Court found that the Civil Service Commission 
had “no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for 
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for 
 
 
 185. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2371 (2001) (“The 
Court’s reasoning in Hampton was notably opaque . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 337 (2000) (“To say the least, Mow Sun Wong is an opaque opinion.”). 
 186. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 187. Id. at 101 (emphasis added); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, 
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 211–12 (1994) (noting that in Mow Sun 
Wong, “the Court held that a federal interest in immigration and alienage matters must be articulated 
by those who are institutionally competent to do so”). 
 188. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  
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naturalization policies.”
191
 The Court stressed that it was “not willing to 
presume that the Chairman of the Civil Services Commission . . . was 
deliberately fostering an interest so far removed from his normal 
responsibilities.”
192
 Upon examining the interests that supposedly 
supported the regulation excluding noncitizens from federal employment, 
the Court found that all except one (administrative convenience) were “not 
matters which are properly the business of the Commission.”
193
 The Court 
then rejected administrative convenience as a justification for the 
regulation, applying what appears to be a due process balancing test to 
conclude that “the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of 
employment opportunities caused by the Commission’s indiscriminate 
policy” outweighed this “hypothetical justification.”
194
 
The second test used by the Court to determine if the regulation was 
intended to serve an overriding national interest involved analyzing 
whether the regulation was “expressly mandated by the Congress or the 
President.”
195
 Congress had delegated to the President the power to 
“prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil 
service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that 
service.”
196
 The President, in turn, had issued an Executive Order 
directing the Civil Service Commission to “establish standards with 
respect to citizenship.”
197
 Pursuant to this authority, the Civil Service 
Commission had promulgated the regulation barring noncitizens from 
federal employment.
198
  
The Court did not find Congress’s general delegation of authority 
sufficient to justify the regulation and, after searching the Appropriations 
Acts, found no evidence of “either Congressional approval or disapproval 
of the specific Commission rule.”
199
 Turning next to the President’s 
Executive Order, the Court explained that even if this Order allowed the 
Commission to require citizenship for all federal positions, “the decision 
to impose the requirement was made by the Commission rather than the 
President.”
200
 In other words, the President’s Executive Order did not 
 
 
 191. Id. at 114. 
 192. Id. at 105. 
 193. Id. at 115. 
 194. Id. at 115–16. 
 195. Id. at 103. 
 196. 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1) (2014); Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114–15. 
 197. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 111. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 103–16. 
 200. Id. at 111–12. 
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expressly mandate the Commission’s rule, as evidenced by the 
Commission’s ability to either retain or modify the citizenship requirement 
without further authorization from the President or Congress.
201
 
The Court’s findings that the Civil Service Commission had no direct 
responsibility over immigration-related national interests, and that neither 
Congress nor the President had expressly mandated the exclusion of 
noncitizens from federal employment, both played a critical role in the 
holding that the regulation was invalid.
202
 A third factor that contributed to 
the Court’s decision was the fact that the regulation raised a constitutional 
question. It is because the regulation “deprive[d] a discrete class of 
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis” that the Court found 
that “some judicial scrutiny” was required.
203
 Although the Court never 
specified what level of scrutiny was appropriate, its decision to strike 
down the regulation indicates a heightened standard of review.
204
 To be 
clear, the Court did not find that the Civil Service Commission had 
exceeded its delegated authority in promulgating the regulation.
205
 Rather, 
the Court found that the agency’s regulation would not be given the 
deferential review that federal classifications involving alienage normally 
receive.
206
 
The reasoning in Mow Sun Wong resonates with the Supreme Court’s 
2015 decision in King v. Burwell, which involved a challenge to an IRS 
regulation that authorized tax credits for purchases on both state and 
federal health insurance exchanges established under the ACA.
207
 There, 
the petitioners argued that the ACA only authorized tax credits for health 
insurance purchased through state exchanges.
208
 In an unusual step, the 
Court decided not to apply Chevron deference but to interpret the statutory 
language itself, reasoning that tax credits are one of the ACA’s key 
reforms, and “had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it 
 
 
 201. Id. at 112–14. 
 202. See supra notes 190–201 and accompanying text. 
 203. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103. 
 204. See Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Separation 
of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 99–100 (2007) (interpreting Mow Sun 
Wong to hold that a heightened standard of judicial review is required where the decision to 
discriminate is not made by Congress or the President). 
 205. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with 
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1774 (2001) (arguing 
that Mow Sun Wong is a leading case on “constitutional ‘who’ rules”); Hartley, supra note 204, at 98–
100. 
 206. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88. 
 207. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 208. Id. at 2487. 
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surely would have done so expressly.”
209
 The Court found it “especially 
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, 
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”
210
 
Even without the specter of the constitutional issues that existed in Mow 
Sun Wong, the Court was skeptical that Congress would allow an agency 
to make an important decision in an area where it lacked relevant 
expertise.  
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Oregon, a case about physician-assisted 
suicide, the Court was wary of the Attorney General’s “claimed authority 
to determine appropriate medical standards.”
211
 The Court reasoned: 
Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account 
in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates 
interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the 
reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to invest 
interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to 
develop these attributes.
212
  
Any deference that the Court normally would have given to the 
Department of Justice’s interpretation was “tempered by the Attorney 
General’s lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any 
consultation with anyone outside the Department of Justice who might aid 
in a reasoned judgment.”
213
  
The decisions in Mow Sun Wong, King, and Gonzales all demonstrate 
the Court’s reluctance to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statutory provision if the subject is outside the agency’s area of 
expertise.
214
 When constitutional issues are at stake, the need for expertise 
is especially important. While Wong has not had many progeny, it remains 
good law and indicates that executive agencies are not always equivalent 
in their authority to create alienage-based classifications.
215
  
 
 
 209. Id. at 2489. 
 210. Id.  
 211. 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006). 
 212. Id. at 266–67 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 
144, 153 (1991)). 
 213. Id. at 269. 
 214. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 185, at 337 (“The narrowest reading of the opinion [in Mow Sun 
Wong] is that the Court will not interpret an ambiguous statutory provision to allow an agency to reach 
a constitutionally questionable decision on a subject outside its expertise.”).  
 215. Justice Powell relied on Wong in two cases involving race-conscious programs. See Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (reasoning that “the 
legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate 
governmental authority has found that [past discrimination] has occurred”); Regents of the Univ. of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/7
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C. Discrimination Pursuant to Federal-State Hybrids 
Under the framework established by Graham and Mathews, laws that 
would violate equal protection if enacted by a state are usually legitimate 
if enacted by Congress.
216
 The analysis becomes more complicated, 
however, when the federal government authorizes states to discriminate 
based on alienage.
217
 The Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o 
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United 
States.”
218
 Accordingly, Plyler advised, “if the Federal Government has by 
uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the 
treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal 
direction.”
219
 But courts do not always agree on what constitutes a 
“uniform” rule. In fact, courts are currently divided about what standard of 
review applies to alienage-based eligibility restrictions in state laws 
implementing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “Welfare Reform Act”), as some have 
concluded that the statute prescribes a uniform rule, while others see no 
such uniformity.  
The Welfare Reform Act provides eligibility requirements regarding 
noncitizens’ access to both federal and state benefits. For state-funded 
benefits, the Act creates a category of noncitizens to whom states must 
provide all benefits, another category of noncitizens to whom states cannot 
provide any benefits, and a third category of noncitizens for whom states 
are given discretion to determine what, if any, benefits to provide.
220
 This 
third category, which allows states to determine benefit eligibility based 
on alienage, has been challenged in both federal and state courts. On the 
federal level, three appellate courts—the First, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits—have addressed this issue and upheld state restrictions under 
rational basis review.
221
 On the state level, the highest courts of New 
 
 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309–10 (1978) (rejecting the Regents’ affirmative action plan and 
explaining that the Regents lacked the “capability” to make the necessary findings and adopt the 
policy, as it was not within their “broad mission” and they did not have a mandate to do so from the 
state legislature). 
 216. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). 
 217. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration 
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
 218. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 219. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 220. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1624 (2014). 
 221. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 
2004); see also Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014) (denying the equal protection claim on 
the basis that the Medicaid-eligible noncitizens were not similarly situated to citizens). 
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York, Maryland, and Massachusetts have all applied strict scrutiny and 
struck down such restrictions as a violation of equal protection. 
Connecticut’s Supreme Court applied rational basis review, but only after 
finding that the state statute did not actually discriminate based on 
alienage.
222
  
1. Decisions Applying Rational Basis Review 
In Soskin v. Reinertson, the Tenth Circuit considered the argument that 
allowing states to determine benefit eligibility under the Welfare Reform 
Act violated the Naturalization Clause of the US Constitution, which 
requires Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” and has 
been interpreted broadly to refer to federal control over the status of 
aliens.
223
 In rejecting this argument, the Court examined the historical 
origins of the Naturalization Clause, which was a response to divergent 
state naturalization laws that allowed an alien ineligible for citizenship in 
one state to become a citizen in another state and then return to the original 
state as a citizen entitled to all of its privileges and immunities.
224
 The 
Tenth Circuit found that the purpose of the uniformity requirement was 
not undermined by the discretion given to states under the Welfare Reform 
Act because “the choice by one state to grant or deny . . . benefits to an 
alien does not require another state to follow suit.”
225
  
The Ninth Circuit recently agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in 
Korab v. Fink, finding that the Welfare Reform Act as a whole 
“establishes a uniform federal structure for providing welfare benefits to 
distinct classes of aliens,” and that “a state’s limited discretion to 
implement a plan for a specified category of aliens does not defeat or 
undermine uniformity.”
226
 Analogizing to bankruptcy law, the court 
explained that the principle of uniformity does not require the elimination 
of differences among states, but rather that the basic operation of the 
 
 
 222. Compare Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006), Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2011), and Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 
1085 (N.Y. 2001), with Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011) (applying rational basis 
review). 
 223. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 4; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256–57. 
 224. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256–57; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 36 (1824); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 225. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1257. 
 226. Korab, 797 F.3d at 581. 
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federal statute be uniform.
227
 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
Hawaii’s decision to deny Medicaid benefits to noncitizens from three 
Micronesian nations who were lawfully present in the country as 
nonimmigrants pursuant to Compacts of Free Association that those 
nations had with the United States.
228
 The case, however, produced three 
separate opinions, and it does not appear that two of the judges actually 
agreed on the equal protection analysis. Judge Bybee, who wrote a 
concurring opinion, based his vote on a preemption analysis, 
acknowledging that “if we looked exclusively to equal protection 
principles, I think it is likely that Hawai’i’s law would fall.”
229
 
The dissents in Soskin and Korab argued that strict scrutiny was the 
correct standard of review, stressing Graham’s warning that “Congress 
does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.”
230
 Both dissents challenged the majorities’ 
conclusion that Congress had created a uniform law in allowing states to 
decide whether to restrict eligibility for benefits for certain noncitizens. 
Judge Clifton, dissenting in Korab, noted that “[a] federal ‘direction’ that 
points in two opposite ways is not a direction” and characterized 
Congress’s delegation of power to the states as a “lit firecracker, at risk of 
exploding when a state exercised its discretion to discriminate on the basis 
of alienage.”
231
 He found that the majority’s analogy to the 
conceptualization of uniformity in bankruptcy law failed to fit because that 
analogy ignored “the crucially important counterweight” of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which is absent from the bankruptcy arena.
232
 In Judge 
Clifton’s view, “[t]he option given to the states by Congress to decide 
whether to treat aliens differently was illusory,” in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Graham.
233
 Both dissents also noted that, under 
Graham, a state’s financial condition does not provide a compelling 
justification to treat noncitizens differently.
234
  
While the First Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Tenth and 
Ninth Circuits in reviewing Maine’s legislation terminating noncitizens 
 
 
 227. Id. at 581–82. For a critique of this analogy to bankruptcy law, see Wishnie, supra note 217, 
at 535–37. 
 228. Korab, 797 F.3d at 577–84. 
 229. Id. at 597–98 (Bybee, J., concurring). 
 230. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971); Korab, 797 F.3d at 599, 602–05 (Clifton, 
J., dissenting) (citing Graham); Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1265–68, 1270–75 (Henry, J., dissenting) (same). 
 231. Korab, 797 F.3d at 602, 605 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 603–04. 
 233. Id. at 599. 
 234. Id. at 600; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1272–73 (Henry, J., dissenting). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1271 
 
 
 
 
from state benefits, it applied a different analysis.
235
 The court found that 
the disparate treatment of noncitizens was not attributable to Maine’s 
statute but to the Welfare Reform Act’s alienage-based restrictions on 
eligibility for public welfare benefits.
236
 Accordingly, the court found “no 
class of similarly situated citizens with whom the appellants can be 
compared vis-à-vis the state of Maine,” which undermined the equal 
protection claim.
237
 In light of its finding that Maine had drawn no 
distinctions based on alienage, the court found it unnecessary to reach the 
issue of whether Maine was following a uniform federal policy.
238
 Thus, 
not only are courts divided about the standard of review, but the courts 
that have rejected equal protection challenges do not agree on the 
reasoning. 
2. Decisions Applying Strict Scrutiny 
Like the dissents in the Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions discussed 
above, the three state courts that applied strict scrutiny to strike down 
similar state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause reasoned that 
Congress had failed to prescribe a “uniform” rule by allowing states to 
determine for themselves the extent to which they would discriminate 
against certain categories of noncitizens. In Matter of Aliessa, New York’s 
highest court addressed an equal protection challenge to a state law that 
implemented title IV of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.
239
 Prior to that Act, 
New York had provided state Medicaid to needy recipients without 
distinguishing between legal aliens and citizens.
240
 The court examined 
“whether title IV can constitutionally authorize New York to determine for 
itself the extent to which it will discriminate against legal aliens for State 
Medicaid eligibility.”
241
 In holding that Congress could not authorize such 
discrimination, the court relied heavily on Graham, which had explained 
that “congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures 
to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for 
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the] 
 
 
 235. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 236. Id. at 71. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
 240. Id. at 1089–90. 
 241. Id. at 1096–99. 
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explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”
242
 The court reasoned 
that title IV does not impose a uniform immigration rule for states to 
follow, as it authorizes states to extend state benefits even to aliens not 
lawfully present, while also authorizing states to withhold state Medicaid 
even from aliens eligible for federal Medicaid.
243
 In other words, “States 
are free to discriminate in either direction—producing not uniformity, but 
potentially wide variation based on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of 
largesse, economics and politics.”
244
 According to the court, a uniform 
rule would require each state to “carry out the same policy under the 
mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to set immigration 
policy.”
245
 The court concluded that title IV was “directly in the teeth of 
Graham” by authorizing states to extend the ineligibility period for federal 
Medicaid for LPRs beyond five years and terminate federal Medicaid 
eligibility for refugees and asylees after seven years. Indeed, the court 
found that title IV went “significantly beyond what the Graham Court 
declared constitutionally questionable” by “impermissibly authoriz[ing] 
each State to decide whether to disqualify many otherwise eligible aliens 
from State Medicaid.”
246
 The court therefore applied strict scrutiny and 
held that the state law violated equal protection.
247
  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the reasoning of the 
New York Court of Appeals. Prior to 2006, Maryland chose to provide 
non-emergency medical benefits to LPRs excluded from federal benefits 
by the Welfare Reform Act because they did not satisfy a five-year 
residency requirement.
248
 Maryland’s Fiscal Year 2006 budget cut off 
these benefits.
249
 In Ehrlich v. Perez, the court considered an equal 
protection challenge to the termination of benefits for this group of 
LPRs.
250
 The parties agreed that if Congress had prescribed “a truly 
uniform rule” for the treatment of aliens, and a state abided by that rule in 
discriminating against or between resident aliens, then an equal protection 
challenge would receive only rational basis review.
251
 After a lengthy 
analysis of Supreme Court decisions, the court assumed, without deciding, 
 
 
 242. Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971)). 
 243. Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1098–99. 
 248. Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1225 (Md. 2006). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See generally id. 
 251. Id. at 1232. 
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that this “uniform rule” principle was correct.
252
 But the court found that 
the Welfare Reform Act prescribed no such uniform rule, since Congress 
had provided the states with “unbridled discretion” to decide whether or 
not to provide state-funded medical benefits to resident aliens who did not 
meet the five-year residency requirement.
253
 The court reasoned that 
Congress’s “grant of discretion, without more, is not a uniform rule for 
purposes of imposing only a rational basis test.”
254
 In other words, “[t]his 
laissez faire federal approach to granting discretionary authority to the 
States . . . does not prescribe a single, uniform or comprehensive 
approach.”
255
 
Along the same lines, from 2006 to 2009, Massachusetts allowed aliens 
who are federally ineligible under the Welfare Reform Act to participate in 
the state’s Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program.
256
 While the 
program is supported by both state and federal funds, only state funds 
were used to subsidize federally ineligible enrollees.
257
 In 2009, the state 
legislature passed a statute that adopted the same eligibility standards set 
forth in the Welfare Reform Act.
258
 Residents of Massachusetts who lost 
their health insurance or were found ineligible based on their alienage 
brought a class action arguing that their right to equal protection had been 
violated.
259
 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that 
strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.
260
 The court 
stressed that the Welfare Reform Act allows States to choose whether or 
not to follow federal eligibility rules and “merely declares that Federal 
policy will not be thwarted if States decide to discriminate against 
qualified aliens.”
261
 In this situation, “[w]here the State is left with a range 
of options including discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, its 
selection amongst those options must be reviewed under the standards 
applicable to the State and not those applicable to Congress.”
262
 The court 
contrasted this scenario, where Congress “enacts a noncompulsory rule” 
that the state voluntarily adopts, with a situation where Congress 
 
 
 252. Id. at 1240–41. 
 253. Id. at 1241. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Mass. 2011). 
 257. Id. at 1266–67. 
 258. Id. at 1267. 
 259. Id. at 1268. 
 260. Id. at 1277. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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establishes “uniform national guidelines and policies dictating how States 
are to regulate and legislate issues relating to aliens,” clarifying that strict 
scrutiny applies to the former, although rational basis review applies to the 
latter.
263
 
The conclusions of these state courts are directly antithetical to the 
conclusions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, creating a division among 
courts about the proper standard of review for hybrid statutes that bridge 
state and federal action. 
D. Summary of Standards of Review 
The foregoing demonstrates that alienage-based classifications have 
evaded any clear system of tiered scrutiny. At the state level, where 
alienage is supposed to be treated as a suspect classification, uncertainty 
remains as to whether all lawfully present aliens, or just some subset of 
them, are entitled to strict scrutiny. At the federal level, where the plenary 
power restricts the extent of judicial review, there are mounting questions 
about whether the same deference is owed to the President as to Congress 
in immigration matters. In addition, there is little guidance beyond Mow 
Sun Wong to explain the deference owed to an executive agency without 
direct responsibility over immigration that chooses to impose alienage-
based classifications absent an express mandate from Congress or the 
President. Finally, courts are divided about whether states engage in 
prohibited discrimination when they decide to adopt alienage-based 
classifications articulated by Congress in federal statutes. Each of these 
gray areas complicates the analysis of whether the exclusion of DACA 
recipients from the ACA violates equal protection principles.  
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF THE EXCLUSION OF DACA 
RECIPIENTS FROM THE ACA  
Given Congress’s plenary power over matters affecting noncitizens, 
this Article does not dispute that Congress was authorized to decide that 
only “a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present 
in the United States” may be treated as a “qualified individual” and 
“covered under a qualified health plan in the individual market that is 
 
 
 263. Id. at 1274–75 (contrasting the present case to the uniform rule that was challenged in Doe v. 
Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Mass. 2002), and received rational basis 
review). 
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offered through an Exchange.”
264
 Nor does this Article challenge 
Congress’s authorization to delegate to HHS the job of determining who is 
“lawfully present in the United States.”
265
 Instead, this Part explores what 
standard of review should apply to HHS’s regulation defining who is 
“lawfully present” and whether the regulation survives that standard. 
While HHS is part of the executive branch, under Wong, it does not 
automatically receive the same deference given to Congress or the 
President just because it is a federal agency. The amount of deference will 
depend on whether HHS is regulating in its area of expertise and whether 
it has an express mandate from Congress or the President to exclude 
DACA recipients from the definition of “lawfully present.” In addition, 
there is a question about whether DACA recipients, who have only 
deferred action status, are ever entitled to strict scrutiny, or if their status 
automatically limits them to rational basis review. In the event that 
rational basis review applies, is an interpretation of “lawfully present” that 
treats people with the exact same status differently rational? Finally, since 
the ACA does not require states to create their own Marketplaces, are they 
engaging in prohibited discrimination by choosing to do so, or are they 
merely following a federal direction? Each of these questions is discussed 
below. 
A. Does Heightened Scrutiny Apply? 
1. Does HHS Lack Relevant Expertise?  
In Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court indicated that its willingness to 
give deferential review to a discriminatory rule made by a federal agency 
depends on the institutional capacity of that agency.
266
 While HHS plays a 
role in immigration matters, that role is narrowly circumscribed to its 
 
 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2014). 
 265. Id. § 18081(a)(1). The nondelegation doctrine reached its peak during the New Deal era and 
has fallen into desuetude since 1935. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine has become a 
“nondoctrine”). Arguments for its revitalization include checking arbitrary agency action and requiring 
elected officials to make tough policy choices; see also, for example, J. Skelly Wright, Beyond 
Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 584–86 (1972) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)). Arguments against renewal include that 
it could lead to judicial activism or unpredictable policy results. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Returning 
to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 352–53 (1987). Some commentators have proposed 
revitalizing the doctrine in a limited way. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: 
Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1227 (1985) (proposing a model where 
administrative, but not legislative, power would be delegable). 
 266. See Hartley, supra note 204, at 99–100; Motomura, supra note 187, at 211–12. 
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health-related expertise. For example, HHS sets the requirements for the 
medical examination of noncitizens seeking admission to the United States 
and provides guidance on issues related to refugee health and 
resettlement.
267
 HHS does not, however, have direct responsibility over 
immigration; like the Civil Service Commission in Wong, HHS is not 
involved in foreign affairs, treaty negotiations, naturalization policies, or 
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry. In attempting to 
define who is “lawfully present” in the country, HHS took on a task 
outside its realm of expertise. This raises a serious question about whether 
HHS’s decision to define all individuals with deferred action status except 
DACA recipients as “lawfully present” should receive the deference 
normally given to the federal government when regulating immigration. 
The question about the appropriate level of deference becomes 
particularly salient when one takes into account that HHS’s definition of 
“lawfully present” departs from the interpretations of all other agencies, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, which is the agency with 
direct responsibility over immigration. In addressing eligibility to apply 
for Title II Social Security benefits, DHS has defined “lawfully present” to 
include all individuals with deferred action status.
268
 Although DHS is 
currently updating this regulation, it has not proposed any changes to its 
definition of “lawfully present,” such as carving out an exception for 
DACA recipients.
269
  
The Department of Agriculture has followed DHS’s lead and defined 
“legally present” to have the same meaning that DHS gave “lawfully 
present.”
270
 It also explicitly adopted DHS’s definition of “lawfully 
present” in defining who is “lawfully residing in the U.S.” for purposes of 
the Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program.
271
 Likewise, the 
Department of Transportation adopted DHS’s definition of “lawfully 
 
 
 267. See Medical Examination of Immigrants and Refugees, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/exams/medical-examination.html (last visited 
May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/E9B6-RMEA; OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr (last visited May 13, 2016). 
 268. 8 C.F.R. § 103.12(a)(4)(vi) (2001) (including “[a]liens currently in deferred action status” 
among the categories of noncitizens eligible for Title II Social Security benefits under Pub L. No. 104-
193); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2016) (same). 
 269. See Immigration Benefits Business Transformation, Increment I, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,764, 53,780 
(Aug. 29, 2011). 
 270. 7 C.F.R. § 2502.2 (2016) (“Legally present in the United States shall have the same meaning 
as the term ‘lawfully present’ in the United States as defined at 8 CFR 103.12(a) . . . .”). 
 271. Id. § 273.4(a)(7) (“For purposes of determining eligible alien status in accordance with 
paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(6)(ii)(I) of this section ‘lawfully residing in the U.S.’ means that the alien is 
lawfully present as defined at 8 CFR 103.12(a).”). 
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present” in the regulations implementing the Uniform Act.
272
 The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development incorporated the 
Department of Transportation’s definition of “lawfully present,” thereby 
also adopting DHS’s definition.
273
  
In launching a new program in December 2014 that allows Central 
American minors whose parents are “lawfully present” in the United 
States to apply for refugee status in their home countries, the Department 
of State defined “lawfully present” to include individuals with deferred 
action status and explicitly included DACA recipients in this category.
274
 
Finally, at one point, DHS’s own website informed DACA recipients: 
“[Y]ou are considered to be lawfully present in the United States.”
275
 The 
district court that issued a preliminary injunction to stop implementation 
of the expanded DACA and DAPA policies pointed this out and 
characterized the policies as forms of action rather than inaction because 
they conferred this benefit of lawful presence.
276
 HHS is currently the only 
agency that has departed from DHS’s expert interpretation of “lawfully 
present,” throwing its own interpretation of this term into question. 
2. Was There an Express Mandate from Congress? 
Under Mow Sun Wong, an executive agency that lacks immigration 
expertise can still make alienage-based classifications if there is an express 
mandate from Congress or the President.
277
 Here, Congress could not 
possibly have mandated the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA, 
since DACA did not exist in 2010 when the ACA was enacted. The ACA 
only mandates the exclusion of individuals who are not lawfully present; it 
is silent about the categories of noncitizens who qualify as lawfully 
present.
278
  
 
 
 272. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(2) (2016). 
 273. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 972.130(b)(5)(ii), 972.230(g)(5)(ii) (2016) (referencing 49 C.F.R. 
§ 24.208). 
 274. See Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Launch of In-Country Refugee/Parole Program for 
Children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with Parents Lawfully Present in the United States 
(Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234655.htm; see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, FORM DS-7699: AFFIDAVIT OF RELATIONSHIP (AOR) FOR MINORS WHO ARE NATIONALS 
OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS (2014). 
 275. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 660–61 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (issuing a temporary 
injunction to stop the expanded DACA and DAPA policies from taking effect). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See supra notes 189, 195 and accompanying text. 
 278. See 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2014). 
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Furthermore, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides no basis for 
the distinction drawn by HHS. The INA and its implementing regulations 
make it clear that noncitizens are considered “unlawfully present” only if 
their stay is not authorized by DHS.
279
 All individuals with deferred action 
status are in a period of authorized stay. They therefore do not accrue 
unlawful presence and are eligible to apply for an employment 
authorization.
280
 Thus, HHS’s interpretation of “lawful presence” conflicts 
with Congress’s use of the term in the INA.  
In 2013, after HHS promulgated the regulation that excluded DACA 
recipients from the ACA, the Senate expressed approval of the regulation 
by incorporating its interpretation into the comprehensive immigration 
reform bill it passed that year. Under the legalization program set forth in 
that bill, noncitizens granted “registered provisional immigration status” 
generally would have been considered lawfully present in the United 
States, but they would have been subject to the rules applicable to 
individuals not lawfully present under the ACA and would not have been 
eligible for premium tax credits.
281
 This post hoc approval of a regulation, 
however, cannot be construed as an express mandate, which must 
necessarily precede the rule.
282
 Furthermore, Congress never passed the 
comprehensive immigration reform bill, so it should not be taken as 
evidence of Congress’s views.
283
 
3. Was There an Express Mandate from the President? 
Since there was no express mandate from Congress, the next question 
is whether there was an express mandate from the President to exclude 
DACA recipients from benefits under the ACA. When President Obama 
introduced DACA, he described it as a program that would help create a 
more inclusive society, stressing that the beneficiaries of this program 
“study in our schools, . . . play in our neighborhoods, [are] friends with our 
 
 
 279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2014); 8 C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3) (2016); see also Frequently 
Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last updated 
June 15, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/8E5Y-87QG [hereinafter USCIS FAQS]. 
 280. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). 
 281. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 245B(d)(4)(A), (C) (2013). 
 282. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) 
(“Where an agency fails to follow the PRA in regard to an information collection request that the 
agency promulgates via regulation, at its own discretion, and without express prior mandate from 
Congress, a citizen may indeed escape penalties for failing to comply with the agency’s request.”). 
 283. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (“Though ‘instructive,’ 
failure to act on the proposed bill is not conclusive of Congress’ views . . . .”). 
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kids, [and] pledge allegiance to our flag.”
284
 He described them as 
“Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on 
paper.”
285
 Excluding DACA recipients from the ACA while including 
others with the same legal status is totally inconsistent with this vision of 
inclusion. Such exclusion also conflicts with the President’s focus on 
helping a productive group of young people “make extraordinary 
contributions” to society, since denial of affordable health care clearly 
hampers productivity.
286
  
On the other hand, news reports indicate that the decision to exclude 
DACA recipients from health care benefits under the ACA came from the 
White House.
287
 The reports characterized the White House’s decision as 
a political one, resulting from the collision of two highly controversial 
issues: health care and immigration.
288
 Since conservative lawmakers had 
adamantly opposed providing government health care to “illegal 
immigrants,” excluding DACA recipients, who were perceived as “illegal” 
even after being granted deferred action status, helped avoid another layer 
of controversy over health care reform.
289
  
But can such reports be construed as an “express mandate” from the 
President? Mow Sun Wong described an express mandate as an “explicit 
directive” and found that the President’s Executive Order giving the Civil 
Service Commission discretion “to establish standards with respect to 
citizenship” did not constitute such a mandate, as it was “not necessarily a 
command to require citizenship as a general condition of eligibility for 
federal employment.”
290
 The Court further reasoned that there was no 
express mandate from the President because the Commission could retain, 
modify, or repeal the citizenship requirement “without further 
authorization from Congress or the President.”
291
 The same situation 
exists here with respect to HHS’s exclusion of DACA recipients from the 
ACA. The fact that HHS has already amended its interpretation of 
 
 
 284. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.; see also generally PETER HARBAGE & BEN FURNAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE COST 
OF DOING NOTHING ON HEALTH CARE: LOST PRODUCTIVITY COSTS STATES $124 BILLION TO $248 
BILLION (2009).  
 287. Shear & Pear, supra note 57 (“The White House decision to deny health benefits also 
underscores how far the president’s expected actions will fall short of providing the kind of full 
membership in American society that activists have spent decades fighting for.”). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 111–12, 113 n.46 (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. at 113. 
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“lawfully present” without explicit authorization from Congress or the 
President indicates that it was not operating pursuant to an express 
mandate. 
4. Does Having Only Deferred Action Status Matter? 
Even if HHS has no direct responsibility over immigration and there is 
no express mandate from Congress or the President for the exclusion of 
DREAMers from the ACA, the fact that DACA recipients have only 
deferred action status gives rise to questions about whether any heightened 
form of scrutiny is appropriate. As an initial matter, Plyler suggests that 
undocumented immigrants receive only rational basis review, although the 
Court applies rational basis with bite in that case.
292
 Individuals with 
deferred action status, however, can be distinguished from undocumented 
immigrants because their presence in the United States is authorized by the 
DHS, and they are eligible to work here legally. The fact that HHS 
includes people with deferred action status as “lawfully present,” even 
though it carves out an exception for DACA recipients, shows recognition 
that this status is different than being undocumented. Furthermore, before 
the Welfare Reform Act became law in 1996, the definition of 
“permanently residing in the United States under color of law” 
(“PRUCOL”) included individuals with deferred action status, but not 
undocumented immigrants.
293
 Thus, a clear distinction exists between the 
two categories.  
Accepting that individuals with deferred action status are not 
undocumented, there is still the question about whether non-LPRs should 
receive heightened scrutiny. As discussed above, a circuit split exists on 
this issue, with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits refusing to apply strict scrutiny 
to state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants. At least two reasons 
weigh in favor of rejecting the positions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. 
First, the language used by the Supreme Court does not support this 
position. Graham broadly stated that “[a]liens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate.”
294
 
Furthermore, the factors on which the Fifth and Sixth Circuits relied 
are not as clear-cut as those courts purported them to be. For example, the 
 
 
 292. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 293. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(11) (2016). 
 294. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).  
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courts noted inability to serve in the military as one reason to treat 
nonimmigrants differently than LPRs,
295
 but a small number of 
nonimmigrants—and, more recently, DACA recipients—can serve in the 
military under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest 
(“MAVNI”) program, which targets individuals with special language 
skills critical to national security.
296
 The number of LPRs who serve in the 
military is also relatively small, so service in the military does not appear 
to be a strong basis for treating LPRs and non-LPRs differently.
297
  
Similarly, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ reliance on differential tax 
treatment overlooks the overarching similarity in tax structures. Most 
nonimmigrants are treated as “resident” aliens for tax purposes, just like 
LPRs, as long as they spend at least thirty-one days in the United States in 
the current year and at least 183 days in the period that includes the current 
year and the prior two years.
298
 Thus, a nonimmigrant who spends 183 
days of the year in the United States is automatically a “resident” for tax 
purposes and subject to the same tax rules that apply to LPRs and US 
citizens. DACA recipients should qualify as “residents” for tax purposes 
because they had to show continuous presence in the United States 
between June 15, 2007, and June 15, 2012, and could not have left the 
United States after that period without receiving advance parole. Advance 
parole is normally granted only for short periods of time (e.g., thirty days) 
for specific purposes and therefore should not interfere with satisfying the 
substantial presence test. In addition, insofar as the Sixth Circuit reasoned 
that nonimmigrants may be denied federal welfare benefits,
299
 this does 
not distinguish them from LPRs, who may also be denied such benefits. In 
fact, individuals who have been LPRs for less than five years are excluded 
from most federal benefits.
300
  
Another reason to question the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s approach is 
that several of the factors that led the courts to conclude that 
nonimmigrants should receive only rational basis review do not point in 
the same direction when applied to individuals with deferred action status. 
 
 
 295. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007); 
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 296. Julia Preston, Military Path Opened for Young Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/us/military-path-opened-for-young-immigrants.html. 
 297. See MOLLY F. MCINTOSH, SEEMA SAYALA & DAVID GREGORY, CNA, NON-CITIZENS IN THE 
ENLISTED U.S. MILITARY 24 (2011). 
 298. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A) (2014). 
 299. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 300. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS 1–3 (2011). 
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To begin with, individuals with deferred action status are often as 
entrenched in US society as LPRs—especially DACA recipients, who 
must show at least five years of residency and entry at a young age in 
order to qualify.
301
 Second, the fact that nonimmigrants are subject to 
strict employment restrictions is inapplicable to individuals with deferred 
action status, who receive the type of employment authorization that 
allows them to work at almost any job. Third, the argument that 
nonimmigrants are not a discrete and insular class because they are 
admitted with various types of status does not apply when focusing solely 
on individuals with deferred action status.  
Given the weaknesses in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, its 
inapplicability to individuals with deferred action status, and the Supreme 
Court’s language pointing in the opposite direction, individuals with 
deferred action status should not be denied heightened scrutiny merely 
because of their status. More generally, although the notion of scaling 
scrutiny to proximity to citizenship may seem attractive at first glance, it 
opens the door to an array of problems. Trying to “rank” various types of 
immigration status based on proximity to citizenship is harder than it may 
seem because there is no clear hierarchy. It may be obvious that 
undocumented immigrants are farther from citizenship than 
nonimmigrants, who are farther than LPRs. But it is by no means clear 
how one would compare someone with deferred action status to someone 
who has only a pending application for asylum or who has Temporary 
Protected Status. 
Another issue is that the nature of a deprivation may be so severe that 
closer scrutiny is warranted regardless of the legal status of the individual. 
This was the case in Plyler, where the Court purported to apply rational 
basis review but really applied heightened scrutiny. The sliding-scale 
approach to scrutiny discussed in Part IV below allows courts to consider 
these various factors without selecting a priori a particular tier for judicial 
review.  
 
 
 301. For discussions of social membership and alienage, see, for example, Linda S. Bosniak, 
Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994); 
David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and 
Beyond, 1986 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 177; Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens 
and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996). 
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B. Does the Exclusion Survive Rational Basis Review? 
Even if heightened scrutiny is not applied to the exclusion of DACA 
recipients from the ACA, the exclusion may still be invalid under ordinary 
rational basis review. The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Arizona 
Dream Act Coalition is particularly relevant here. That case involved the 
denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona’s 
policy of prohibiting DACA recipients from receiving driver’s licenses by 
using their work permits as proof of authorized presence, while permitting 
individuals with pending applications for adjustment of status and 
cancellation of removal to do so.
302
 In reversing the denial of the 
preliminary injunction and finding that the equal protection claim was 
likely to succeed on the merits, the court held that DACA recipients are 
similarly situated to individuals with pending applications, since both 
groups have authorization to remain in the country for a temporary period 
and are allowed to obtain work permits.
303
 The court then reasoned that it 
was not necessary to determine what standard of review applies, because 
Arizona’s “differential treatment of otherwise equivalent federal 
immigration classifications” was so arbitrary and irrational as to be 
unlikely to withstand even rational basis review.
304
  
HHS’s differential treatment of DACA recipients is even more striking 
because it distinguishes them from other individuals with the exact same 
status, as well as from individuals with similar types of status. In order to 
survive rational basis review, HHS’s disparate treatment of DACA 
recipients must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Arizona Dream Act Coalition,
305
 
unless there is some basis in federal law for viewing non-DACA recipients 
of deferred action status as having some federally authorized presence that 
DACA recipients lack, the disparate treatment is not rational; no such 
basis exists.  
In fact, HHS’s distinction between DACA recipients and other 
individuals with deferred action status can lead to absurd results. For 
example, many people obtain deferred action status after being ordered 
deported and obtaining a temporary stay of removal. DACA recipients, on 
the other hand, may never have been ordered deported. There is no rational 
explanation for why someone with a stay of removal has more 
 
 
 302. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 303. Id. at 1064. 
 304. Id. at 1066–67. 
 305. See supra notes 302–04 and accompanying text. 
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authorization to be in the United States than someone who was never 
ordered deported in the first place. Furthermore, individuals who have 
pending applications for non-LPR cancellation of removal are considered 
“lawfully present” by HHS, even though this type of relief is very difficult 
to obtain, since it requires showing “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to a citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child.
306
 It is odd to 
consider these applicants lawfully present, when many of them will be 
ordered deported, while excluding DACA recipients, whose deferred 
action status may be extended for an indefinite period of time.  
More generally, HHS’s decision to exclude DACA recipients is not 
rationally related to the objectives of the ACA, which is to increase the 
number of insured individuals and reduce the cost of health care. 
Excluding a class of young, generally healthy individuals from the 
insurance programs established by the ACA drives up the cost of health 
insurance premiums. In addition, when DACA recipients do seek 
treatment, it will often be in emergency rooms, where the cost of care is 
much more expensive. Providing DACA recipients with access to regular 
health care, including preventive care, would avoid paying the higher cost 
of treatment associated with delays in getting medical attention. Including 
DACA recipients in the definition of “lawfully present” individuals would 
also reduce the administrative costs of health care by making it easier to 
determine who qualifies. 
Under the current classification scheme, health care administrators will 
have to determine how various individuals with deferred action obtained 
this classification. In cases where individuals have work authorization, this 
should not be too difficult, as the employment authorization card contains 
a code that explains the category for work authorization, including a code 
specific to DACA. Those who do not have employment authorization, 
however, will have to provide evidence to administrators who have no 
background in immigration law proving how they obtained their deferred 
action status. According to one article, administrative costs in the US 
health care system comprise fourteen percent of all health care 
expenditures, totaling over $360 billion a year.
307
 Simplifying eligibility 
requirements would reduce documentation requirements and help cut 
down this administrative cost. While DHS’s Systematic Alien Verification 
for Entitlements (“SAVE”) program provides an online system to help 
 
 
 306. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2014). 
 307. ELIZABETH WIKLER, PETER BASCH & DAVID CUTLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 3 
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (2012). 
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verify an individual’s immigration status, the accuracy and reliability of 
that system has come under attack.
308
  
In sum, just as the court in Plyler found no evidence in the record to 
support the claim that exclusion of undocumented children was likely to 
improve the overall quality of education in Texas,
309
 HHS would be hard-
pressed to show that excluding DACA recipients from affordable health 
care will improve the overall quality of health care in the country. 
Furthermore, even if health care would be improved by barring some 
number of noncitizens from coverage, HHS would have to “support its 
selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion,” as it cannot 
reduce expenditures for health care by barring “some arbitrarily chosen 
class.”
310
 Finally, denial of health care, like the denial of a basic 
education, is an “enduring disability,”
311
 making the analogy to Plyler 
even more appropriate. Children without access to affordable health care 
are less likely to obtain immunizations that prevent future illnesses and 
receive timely diagnosis of serious health conditions, and they miss more 
days of school.
312
 Similarly, uninsured adults are less likely to receive 
preventive service and have higher rates of “unnecessary morbidity and 
premature death.”
313
 
C. Are States Engaging in Prohibited Discrimination? 
The ACA establishes a complex relationship between the federal 
government and state governments, as it gives states the option of running 
their own state Marketplaces, sharing responsibilities with the federal 
government in running Marketplaces, or refusing to get involved, which 
means that the state would have a “Federally-facilitated [Marketplace].”
314
 
For states that choose to run their own Marketplaces, either alone or in 
partnership with the federal government, a question arises about whether 
they are engaging in prohibited discrimination. As discussed above, courts 
are currently divided about whether Congress can give discretion to the 
 
 
 308. See, e.g., Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66 
(2012). 
 309. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 310. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 
(1969)). 
 311. Id. at 222. 
 312. INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH 
CARE, at 3 (2009).  
 313. Id. at 4. 
 314. 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2016). 
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states to engage in alienage-based discrimination under the Welfare 
Reform Act, in light of Graham’s warning that “Congress does not have 
the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.”
315
 Since administrative agencies are empowered to act by 
enabling statutes, if Congress does not have the power to authorize 
discrimination by States, then certainly an executive agency such as HHS 
would not have the power to do so by adopting a discriminatory definition 
of who is lawfully present. 
As Judge Clifton explained in his dissent in Korab, the way Medicaid 
actually works in most states is that “there is a single plan, administered 
by the state.”
316
 While “[t]he federal government reimburses the state for a 
significant portion of the cost, and the plan must comply with federal 
requirements, . . . it is a state plan.”
317
 Similarly, the state-based 
Marketplaces under the ACA are state plans. According to the highest 
courts of several states, and dissenting voices in the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, discrimination in such state plans must be subject to strict 
scrutiny.
318
 Since the ACA gives states an option about whether or not to 
participate in a Marketplace, states have the option of not discriminating 
against DACA recipients by not participating and leaving discrimination 
to the federal government. The choice for a state about whether to provide 
benefits to DACA recipients, like the choice about whether to provide 
benefits to certain noncitizens under the Welfare Reform Act, arguably is 
not a true choice if it means the state must engage in prohibited 
discrimination. In other words, the same controversy that has emerged 
under the Welfare Reform Act may arise under the ACA.  
Currently, several states have chosen to provide DACA recipients with 
insurance, such as Medicaid, using only state funds. These include 
California, Massachusetts, New York, Washington, and the District of 
Columbia.
319
 Nothing in the ACA prohibits states from doing this, as the 
statute does not address eligibility for state benefits.
320
 DACA recipients 
 
 
 315. See supra Part II.C. 
 316. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 599 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 598–607 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J., dissenting); Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1265–76 (10th Cir. 2004) (Henry, J., dissenting); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 
A.2d 1220, 1243–44 (Md. 2006); Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 
1262, 1279–80 (Mass. 2011); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001). 
 319. See Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Jaqueline Hurtado, States Work Around Obamacare to Help 
Undocumented Immigrants, CNN (Apr. 9, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/09/us/ 
obamacare-undocumented-immigrants/, archived at https://perma.cc/6W8L-KZTF. 
 320. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)–(b), 1622(b) (2014). 
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therefore remain eligible for state-funded programs that include people 
with deferred action status among the categories of people “Permanently 
Residing in the United States Under Color of Law.” For example, DACA 
recipients in California who meet the income criteria are eligible for full-
scope Medi-Cal, which is totally state funded.
321
 If, down the road, these 
states change their minds about using state funds to provide health care to 
DACA recipients, the result may be the same kind of litigation that 
resulted when states stopped using their own funds to provide noncitizens 
with Medicaid after the passage of the Welfare Reform Act. 
IV. POSSIBLE PATHS THROUGH THE QUAGMIRE 
A. Alternative Approaches to Judicial Scrutiny  
There are at least two possible alternatives to the traditional tiered 
approach to judicial scrutiny. One is a sliding-scale approach. Another is 
to simply have a single standard. Justice Marshall argued long ago that 
courts should abandon the tiered system and simply weigh “the character 
of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in 
the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do 
not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the 
classification.”
322
 Justice Stevens similarly expressed dissatisfaction with 
a tiered approach, stating that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection 
Clause,” and it “does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review 
in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”
323
 Many 
commentators have agreed with this perspective, critiquing the tiers and 
proposing alternative models.
324
  
 
 
 321. Letter from Cal. Health & Human Servs. Agency, Dep’t of Health Care Servs., to All County 
Welfare Directors & All County Medi-Cal Program Specialists/Liaisons (Aug. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Documents/MEDIL2014/MEDILI14-45.pdf. 
 322. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 323. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190, 211–12 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 324. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2002) 
(arguing that “existing accounts of equal protection leave the decision whether to treat a classification 
as suspect—and most other decisions as well—to almost completely unguided normative judgment”); 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484 (2004) (“[T]he problems 
with the three-tiered framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration 
of an alternative standard for review . . . .”); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking 
Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 104 (2003) (noting that 
Lawrence and Grutter “call into question the stability of” traditional equal protection standards of 
review); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
945, 970 (2004) (expressing uncertainty about the utility of traditional equal protection classifications); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of 
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Some of the main scholarly critiques of the tiered approach have been 
that it leads the Court to manipulate principles and precedents in order to 
reach the desired result in a particular case and creates inconsistency and 
confusion when the Court deviates from the three established tiers.
325
 In 
addition, there is a sense of stagnation regarding the set of suspect 
classifications, since courts have long been reluctant to recognize any new 
classes.
326
 The tiered approach also tends to miss what Professor Julie 
Nice calls a “co-constitutive third strand” that examines the interaction 
between rights and classes.
327
 Plyler is an example of a case where the 
Court found “neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class” but 
nevertheless invalidated a discriminatory law “because of the right’s 
importance to the targeted class.”
328
 
As Justice Stevens recognized in Cleburne, the Supreme Court’s cases 
actually “reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing 
classifications,” rather than the tiered approach it purports to follow.
329
 
The use of “rational basis with bite” in Cleburne and Plyler are well-
known examples where the Court’s analysis did not conform to the 
traditional tiers.
330
 Rather than characterizing the standard of review in 
these cases as either heightened rational basis or intermediate scrutiny, 
 
 
Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1430–35 (1995); Victor C. Romero, Equal 
Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 573 (1997); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of 
Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177–79 (1984); Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: 
Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2339 (2006). 
 325. Shaman, supra note 324, at 177; see also Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Bybee, J., concurring) (stating that “the Court’s indecision over the equal protection standard of 
review gives these cases [involving alienage-based classifications] the appearance that the standard has 
been manipulated to accommodate the Court’s intuition over the result in the particular case”). 
 326. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 581. 
 327. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: 
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1212. 
 328. Id. Nice articulates two major considerations that led to the results in these cases: “(1) how 
the right (and particularly its denial) marks, defines, and constructs the meaning of the class; and (2) 
how the class (and particularly its exclusion from enjoyment of the right) marks, defines, and 
constructs the meaning of the right.” Id. at 1225. 
 329. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 330. The majority and dissenting opinions in Plyler illustrate the difference between a uniform 
and tiered approach. There, Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion stuck to a strict, tiered mode of 
analysis, reasoning that education was not a fundamental right and undocumented children were not a 
suspect class, so rational basis review applied, and the Texas statute should have been upheld as 
constitutional. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244–48 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion, on the other hand, recognized that more was involved than these “abstract 
question[s]” and took into consideration how the deprivation of a basic education “imposes a lifetime 
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status.” Id. at 223. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1271 
 
 
 
 
courts could acknowledge that it departs from the tiered approach and 
more closely resembles the sliding-scale approach originally proposed by 
Justice Marshall.  
In more recent years, the continuum in standards of review has become 
only more visible. For instance, four of the most important gay rights 
cases decided in the past two decades—Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and 
Obergefell—invalidated discriminatory laws without ever addressing 
whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class.
331
 Consequently, Professor 
William Araiza claims that the tiers are, for all practical purposes, already 
dead.
332
 Perhaps, as Professor Suzanne Goldberg has argued, the tiered 
approach served its purpose “as an unwitting training vehicle for the 
Court,” and the Court has implicitly moved on.
333
 Given the 
inconsistencies that have developed in equal protection jurisprudence 
involving alienage-based classifications, the time may be ripe for the 
Court to explicitly embrace the sliding-scale approach that it is already 
applying in practice. As discussed below, HHS’s regulation should be 
found unconstitutional under a sliding-scale approach, as well as under the 
single standard with three distinct inquiries proposed by Professor 
Goldberg.
334
 
1. Applying a Sliding-Scale Approach  
Under the balancing test proposed by Justice Marshall, HHS’s 
regulation would not pass constitutional muster. Excluding DACA 
recipients from affordable health insurance under the ACA deprives a 
 
 
 331. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–2608 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to license marriages between two same-sex individuals and to recognize 
such marriages lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2684–96 (2013) (striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as violating the 
equality principles of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
576–79 (2003) (striking down Texas’s sodomy law as violating substantive due process); Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 580–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result on an equal protection 
ground); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625–36 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 to the Colorado 
Constitution as violating the Equal Protection Clause). Justice Scalia, in his dissents, accused the Court 
of applying an “unheard-of form of rational-basis review” in Lawrence and failing to employ “normal 
‘rational basis’ analysis” in Romer. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer, 517 U.S. 
at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 332. See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal 
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2014) 
(“[T]he Court has not performed a serious suspect class analysis—or purported to—in nearly thirty 
years. To put that point in more personal terms, no current Justice was sitting the last time the Court 
purported to engage in such an analysis.”). 
 333. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 582. 
 334. See infra Part IV.A.1–2. 
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discrete class of youth who are not culpable for their legal status of access 
to health care, which the Supreme Court has recognized as “a basic 
necessity of life.”
335
 At the same time, it is not clear how giving coverage 
to DACA recipients would harm the government. In fact, the opposite may 
be true. Excluding a group that is younger and healthier than the general 
population would increase health insurance premiums for everyone. The 
ACA seeks to bring more people into the health insurance pool in order to 
spread the risk for insurers and thereby reduce the costs of insurance. 
Denying coverage to DACA recipients is antithetical to this objective. By 
driving up premiums, the exclusion of DACA recipients may also lead to 
more people choosing to remain uninsured and pay the penalty, thereby 
further reducing the number of people in the insurance pool.  
Furthermore, denying DACA recipients coverage under the ACA will 
require them to rely more heavily on safety-net providers, which not only 
shifts the cost of care to state and local governments, but also makes it 
more expensive.
336
 Not having a regular source of health care blocks 
opportunities for preventive care, leading to costly emergency room visits 
and increasing overall future health care needs.
337
  
A third way that the exclusion of DACA recipients increases costs to 
the government is by making the ACA harder to administer. State 
agencies, eligibility workers, and patient navigators will all have to be 
trained about the distinction between deferred action status granted 
through DACA and through other means, and they will have to examine 
more documents to determine the basis for the deferred action status. This 
process not only is time-consuming for the administrators, but it will lead 
to delays for consumers in accessing health care. Finally, denying 
coverage to DACA recipients can increase costs for the government by 
weakening efforts to fight communicable diseases in the general 
 
 
 335. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Roy G. Spece, Jr., Constitutional Attacks Against the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s “Mandating” That Certain Individuals and Employers Purchase Insurance 
While Restricting Purchase by Undocumented Immigrants and Women Seeking Abortion Coverage, 38 
N. KY. L. REV. 489, 543–44 (2011) (arguing that the right to purchase health insurance satisfies 
numerous approaches relevant to identifying a fundamental right); Elizabeth R. Chesler, Note, 
Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to Medicaid: A Denial of Their Equal Protection Rights?, 
17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 274–79 (2008) (arguing that infringements of the right to purchase health 
care deserve heightened scrutiny). 
 336. Adrianne Ortega, . . . And Health Care for All: Immigrants in the Shadow of the Promise of 
Universal Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 195–98 (2009). 
 337. See SUSAN STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: LIFE AND 
DEATH IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 12 (2005) (“Emergency room visits typically cost about four 
times as much as treating the same problem in a regular office visit.”). 
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population.
338
 Taking all of these factors into consideration, a sliding-scale 
approach to judicial scrutiny indicates that the exclusion of DACA 
recipients from access to health care under the ACA violates equal 
protection. 
The Court has explicitly embraced a sliding-scale formulation of 
scrutiny in other contexts and could do so in the equal protection context 
as well. For example, in voting rights cases that implicate both the 
fundamental right to vote and the government’s interest in structuring 
elections, the Supreme Court has “avoided preset levels of scrutiny in 
favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the 
effect of the regulation at issue.”
339
 In First Amendment cases, the Court 
has also applied a sliding-scale approach in certain contexts instead of 
simply categorizing speech as either protected or unprotected.
340
 
Furthermore, in the evolving jurisprudence on the right to bear arms under 
the Second Amendment, federal appellate courts “have grappled with 
varying sliding-scale and tiered-scrutiny approaches, agreeing as a general 
matter that the level of scrutiny applied to gun control regulations depends 
on the regulation’s burden on the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms.”
341
 As one federal appellate judge noted in discussing different 
forms of strict and intermediate scrutiny, “How strong the government 
interest must be, how directly the law must advance that interest, how 
reasonable the alternatives must be—those questions are not always 
framed with precision in two clearly delineated categories, as opposed to 
points on a sliding scale of heightened scrutiny approaches.”
342
 If a sliding 
scale works for analyzing other constitutional issues, it can also be utilized 
in the equal protection context.  
 
 
 338. See, e.g., SHAWN FREMSTAD & LAURA COX, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COVERING NEW AMERICANS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND 
STATE POLICIES RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESS TO PUBLICLY FUNDED HEALTH 
INSURANCE 15 (2004); Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-
Immigrant Provisions of the “Contract with America” Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1044 (2002); 
Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to Health Services: The Public 
Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1632 (2003). 
 339. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008). 
 340. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the court must strike “a 
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern [against] the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees”). 
 341. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nordyke v. King, 
681 F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 342. Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1277 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
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2. Answering Goldberg’s Three Questions 
Professor Suzanne Goldberg proposes a different model than a 
balancing test to replace the tiered framework. Distilling the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, she proposes a single standard 
consisting of three distinct inquiries to determine whether a classification 
is unconstitutional:  
(1) whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation exists for why the 
burdened group has been selected to bear the challenged burden in 
the context at issue;  
(2) whether the justification offered for the line drawing has a 
specific relationship to the classification’s context; and  
(3) whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or 
stereotyping of the class of persons burdened by the legislation.
343
  
If any of these inquiries is not satisfied, then the classification would be 
invalid.
344
 Under this model, too, HHS’s regulation would be 
unconstitutional. 
Professor Goldberg explains that the first question, which she calls the 
“intracontextual inquiry,” “demands that a plausible explanation exist for 
why a group has been singled out for burdensome treatment in a particular 
context.”
345
 As noted above, Plyler emphasized this issue in stating that 
“even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of 
barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State 
must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for 
exclusion.”
346
 Applying this prong of the analysis to the exclusion of 
DREAMers from affordable health insurance under the ACA, there is no 
obvious reason why HHS singled out DREAMers for exclusion from the 
ACA. HHS’s explanation that DREAMers should be excluded because 
giving them health care was not part of the DACA program makes little 
sense since the same could be said for any other group of individuals with 
deferred action status. For example, HHS could have just as easily singled 
out individuals with prior orders of removal who have been granted 
deferred action status on the basis that DHS never intended them to get 
access to health care when it approved them for deferred action status. 
 
 
 343. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 533. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 534. 
 346. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982); see also supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
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The second question proposed by Goldberg is an “extracontextual 
inquiry” that asks whether the justification for the classification is so broad 
that it “could be invoked to justify burdening a trait in all settings, 
effectively allowing for the creation of superior and inferior classes.”
347
 
Treating DACA recipients as inherently different from other noncitizens 
with deferred action status fails this test as well. If DACA recipients can 
be singled out as not “lawfully present” for purposes of coverage under the 
ACA, then what would prevent the government from singling them out for 
denial of other benefits available to individuals with deferred action status 
as well? By signaling that DACA recipients are less deserving of benefits 
than others with the exact same status, HHS opens the door to 
discriminating against DREAMers in all different settings. 
The third question is the “bias inquiry” and asks whether the 
government action gives effect to prejudice and stereotyping.
348
 In 
Cleburne, Romer, and Moreno, for example, the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny after detecting impermissible animus against individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, gays, and hippies, respectively.
349
 The bias inquiry 
does not, however, require evidence of overtly hostile purposes. Goldberg 
explains that “serious defects in the process that led to the classification’s 
adoption” are also relevant to this inquiry.
350
 With respect to HHS’s 
regulation, there may not be evidence of animus by HHS towards 
DREAMers. As explained above, the decision to exclude them from the 
ACA appears to have been a political compromise to appease conservative 
legislators who adamantly opposed giving health care to “illegal 
immigrants.” Certainly, some of those legislators harbor animus against 
DREAMers, along with other immigrants who did not enter the country 
lawfully or fell out of status. Congressman Steve King (R-IA) expressed 
such animus in July 2013, when he told the media: “For everyone [sic] 
who’s a valedictorian, there’s another 100 out there who weigh 130 
pounds—and they’ve got calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re 
hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the desert.”
351
 
 
 
 347. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 544. 
 348. Id. at 544–45. 
 349. Id. at 545–47 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). 
 350. Id. at 548. 
 351. Todd Beamon & John Bachman, Rep. Steve King Slams Norquist over Attacks on 
Immigration, NEWSMAX (July 18, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/king%C2% 
ADnorquist%C2%ADattacks%C2%ADimmigration/2013/07/18/id/515882/, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
3K5E-Y8Y7. 
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Even assuming no overt hostility behind HHS’s regulation, the defects 
in the process through which it was adopted make it vulnerable to attack 
under the bias inquiry. The fact that HHS skipped over regular notice and 
comment procedures, as well as the normal thirty-day waiting period 
before a rule becomes effective, raises serious procedural concerns. 
Although HHS relied on the good cause exception to justify these actions, 
the case law indicates that the exception may have been improperly 
invoked, as discussed further in Subpart IV.B below. In sum, HHS’s 
regulation clearly flunks the first inquiry, likely fails the second one, and 
may also flunk the third inquiry. Since the failure to satisfy any one of 
these inquiries means the government action is unconstitutional under 
Goldberg’s proposal, HHS’s regulation would not survive this equal 
protection analysis, just as it would not survive a sliding-scale balancing 
test. 
B. Avoiding Equal Protection Analysis Altogether 
Another possible approach would be to just avoid equal protection 
analysis and resolve the case under other legal doctrine. For example, 
HHS’s regulation could be challenged under the Administrative Procedure 
Act or under Chevron. After briefly discussing these alternative 
approaches, this Subpart explains why it is nevertheless important to 
resolve the riddle of alienage-based classifications in equal protection law. 
1. Challenging HHS’s Regulation Under the APA 
HHS’s regulation could be challenged as improperly promulgated 
under the APA. As mentioned above, HHS issued the regulation without 
notice and comment based on the “good cause” exception. Under this 
exception, an agency may forego notice and comment when it finds that 
following these procedures is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.”
352
 HHS found that it would be “contrary to the public 
interest” to go through notice and comment because the temporary 
insurance program had already started enrolling eligible individuals and 
had limited funding.
353
 In addition, HHS characterized DACA recipients 
as a “new and unforeseen group” of applicants.
354
  
 
 
 352. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2014). 
 353. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,616 (Aug. 30, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152). 
 354. Id. 
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These reasons are unlikely to satisfy the good cause exception, which 
must be “narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.”
355
 The 
DC Circuit has explained that “[t]he public interest prong of the good 
cause exception is met only in the rare circumstance when ordinary 
procedures—generally presumed to serve the public interest—would in 
fact harm that interest.”
356
 Furthermore, all of the same factors that HHS 
used to justify the exception—active enrollment, the temporary nature of 
the program, and limited funding—were present in 2010 when HHS 
initially defined “lawfully present” to include everyone with deferred 
action status.  
It could also be argued that HHS had adequate time to go through 
notice and comment procedures. If HHS had promptly published a 
proposed change to the definition of “lawfully present” after the DACA 
program was announced on June 15, 2012, then the normal notice and 
comment process could have been completed before any DACA 
applications were approved.
357
 Finally, many circuits have held that an 
agency must go through notice and comment when promulgating a rule 
that represents a significant shift in regulatory direction. Under the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an 
interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally 
modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment 
rulemaking.”
358
 The Supreme Court is currently reviewing this doctrine in 
a pending case, and its decision may prove relevant to determining 
whether HHS complied with the APA’s requirements.
359
 
2. Challenging HHS’s Regulation Under Chevron  
Another approach is to challenge HHS’s regulation interpreting 
“lawfully present” to exclude DACA recipients as an invalid interpretation 
 
 
 355. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Util. Solid Waste 
Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 356. Id. at 95; see also Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 236 F.3d at 754 (quoting Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (stating that the exception “‘should be 
limited to emergency situations’”). 
 357. See Julia Preston, U.S. Says Fast Pace Continues on Reprieves for Young Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/us/us-cites-fast-pace-on-reprieves-for-
young-illegal-immigrants.html?_r=0 (stating that DHS had approved twenty-nine DACA applicants by 
September 14, 2012). 
 358. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 
abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 359. Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199. 
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of the statute under Chevron.
360
 The first step of Chevron requires courts 
to ask whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue.
361
 In other 
words, has Congress explicitly addressed whether DACA recipients 
should be considered “lawfully present” in the United States, such that the 
ACA would apply to them? In answering this question, courts would look 
at the plain language of the ACA, as well as its object and purpose and its 
legislative history.
362
 Here, neither the text of the ACA nor its legislative 
history address this issue, since DACA did not exist when Congress 
passed the ACA. One argument that could be made under the first step of 
Chevron is that excluding DACA recipients undercuts the object and 
purpose of the ACA, as discussed above. Another argument is that 
Congress’s statutory directive to HHS was to define the categories of 
“lawfully present” individuals. The plain language of the statute therefore 
indicates that Congress left it to HHS to determine which types of status 
qualify as lawful presence under the ACA. But nothing in the statute 
indicates congressional permission to classify aliens based on how they 
obtained their status. 
Assuming that Congress did not speak directly to the issue, the next 
question under Chevron is whether HHS’s interpretation is reasonable.
363
 
HHS’s interpretation is seriously vulnerable under this second prong. 
Courts are reluctant to show deference to an agency interpretation that is 
inconsistent with prior interpretations.
364
 Here, HHS recognized that 
deferred action status constitutes “lawful presence” but then changed its 
mind and decided that DACA recipients with this status are not “lawfully 
present.” Furthermore, HHS’s interpretation of “lawfully present” in the 
ACA is inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act and its 
implementing regulations, which make it clear that noncitizens are 
considered “unlawfully present” only if their stay is not authorized by 
DHS.
365
 All individuals with deferred action status are in a period of 
authorized stay under the INA.
366
  
Although HHS is interpreting the ACA and not the INA, the Supreme 
Court has held that there is a presumption that Congress uses the same 
 
 
 360. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 361. Id. at 842–43. 
 362. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). 
 363. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45. 
 364. E.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012). 
 365. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (2016); see also USCIS 
FAQs, supra note 279. 
 366. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). 
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term consistently in different statutes.
367
 Moreover, the Court has held that 
a single, undifferentiated term in a statute must be given the same meaning 
in all of its potential applications.
368
 The Court observed that giving the 
same term different meanings “would be to invent a statute rather than 
interpret one.”
369
 Even if a statutory term is ambiguous, the Court 
explained, that does not justify two different simultaneous constructions of 
the same phrase depending on the category of aliens to which the phrase is 
applied.
370
 The Court noted that a contrary holding would establish a 
“dangerous principle” that the same text could be given “different 
meanings in different cases.”
371
  
Here, “lawfully present” is a single term, yet HHS has given it two 
different interpretations when applied to two different groups: for DACA 
recipients, deferred action status does not constitute lawful presence, but 
for everyone else, it does.
372
 This construction is impossible to square with 
 
 
 367. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (stressing the “premise that when 
Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is 
enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the 
same meaning in both statutes”); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 254 (1994) 
(displaying similar reasoning); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (holding that to overcome the presumption that the same term had the same meaning in different 
statutes, the Department of Commerce was required to provide reasonable explanation); cf. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85–86 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“[W]hen judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, 
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate 
its . . . judicial interpretations as well.”). But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (warning that courts “must be careful not to apply rules 
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination”); Atl. 
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“Where the subject-matter to 
which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are 
different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in 
another, the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration 
of the language in which those purposes are expressed, and of the circumstances under which the 
language was employed.”); Global Computer Enters. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 350, 410 (2009) 
(“[A]bsent congressional intent to the contrary, the same term need not have the same definition in two 
wholly distinct statutes . . . .”). 
 368. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005). 
 369. Id. 
 370. See id. 
 371. Id. at 386; see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000) (“[W]e refuse 
to adopt a construction that would attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the same 
sentence, depending on which object it is modifying.”). 
 372. The term “deferred action” appears at various places in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i) (2014) (describing certain categories of noncitizens eligible for 
deferred action and work authorization); id. § 1227(d)(2) (“The denial of a request for an 
administrative stay of removal under this subsection shall not preclude the alien from applying for a 
stay of removal, deferred action, or a continuance or abeyance of removal proceedings under any other 
provision of the immigration laws of the United States.”). 
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the statute under the Supreme Court precedents discussed above. The 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance lends additional support to the 
argument that “lawfully present” cannot be construed to include 
individuals with deferred action status but to exclude DREAMers. Under 
this doctrine, if a statute is ambiguous but one interpretation “would raise 
serious constitutional problems,” that interpretation is not given any 
deference.
373
 For all of the reasons discussed in Part III above, HHS’s 
interpretation raises a serious equal protection issue. The traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation therefore indicate that HHS’s interpretation is 
unreasonable and would not survive step two of Chevron.  
Indeed, HHS’s lack of expertise in the area of immigration and the 
significant economic and political issues at stake in determining which 
categories of noncitizens qualify for health insurance suggest that Chevron 
deference may not even apply. As noted above, in King v. Burwell, the 
Supreme Court did not apply Chevron in a case challenging an IRS 
regulation interpreting the ACA’s tax credit provisions.
374
 Instead, it 
simply decided to interpret the ACA itself, noting the IRS’s lack of 
expertise in crafting health insurance policy and the deep economic and 
political significance of the question regarding whether tax credits are 
available on federal Exchanges.
375
 It is also unclear whether HHS 
consulted with DHS about how to define “lawfully present.” Lack of 
expertise combined with failure to engage in such consultation would 
temper any deference given to HHS’s interpretation.
376
  
3. Why Equal Protection Still Matters 
Even if multiple ways exist to analyze a legal issue involving alienage-
based classifications, there are important reasons not to ignore the equal 
protection problem. First, in some cases, the equal protection issue may be 
determinative of the outcome. For example, in Korab, where the Ninth 
Circuit upheld Hawaii’s law excluding certain nonimmigrants from health 
benefits, Judge Bybee’s concurrence noted that “[t]he choice between a 
pure preemption analysis and a pure equal protection analysis yields very 
different results.”
377
 Furthermore, if courts decide to bypass challenging 
 
 
 373. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988). 
 374. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 376. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006). 
 377. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 596 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring). 
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equal protection issues, the legal standards will never be clarified, 
reinforcing the current conundrum surrounding alienage classifications. In 
highlighting the tensions in every area—from federal authority to state 
authority to hybrid statutes—this Article underscores the urgency for legal 
reform. It is difficult to understand how the standard of review for a 
classification that has been recognized as a suspect class for over forty 
years remains in such a state of disarray. If federal appellate judges 
describe the law as “unsustainable” and a “morass of conflicting 
approaches,”
378
 then the time has come for simplification and change.  
Clarifying the treatment of alienage-based classification is also critical 
because of the role that equal protection principles have played in 
groundbreaking social changes during the past century, including the end 
of egregious forms of discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual 
orientation. Equal protection analysis plays a unique and distinct role 
specific to preventing arbitrary discrimination that cannot be replaced by 
preemption analysis, the APA, Chevron, or other doctrines. Moreover, 
unlike many other legal concepts, equal protection principles have the 
special ability to evolve over time. We are now at a historical moment 
where perceptions of prejudice based on alienage are shifting, but the 
government still maintains that discrimination, even overt racial 
discrimination, is permissible in the arena of immigration.
379
 Clarifying 
the equal protection jurisprudence in this area is therefore essential to 
protecting against invidious discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
In the thirty-three years since Plyler was decided, tremendous changes 
have taken place in immigration law. Many of the children who were 
undocumented at that time are now US citizens due to the legalization 
program that was part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986. Similarly, if some type of legalization program is passed in the 
future, today’s DACA recipients will become tomorrow’s citizens. 
 
 
 378. Id. at 584, 598. Judge Bybee favored a preemption analysis, which Hawaii’s law would 
survive, over an equal protection analysis, which he thought Hawaii’s law would likely fail, due to the 
“unsustainable” state of the law regarding alienage-based classifications. Id. at 593–98. 
 379. For example, in a recent case argued before the Supreme Court about whether consular 
denials of visas are subject to any kind of judicial review, one of the questions asked by Justice Breyer 
during oral argument was whether a consular official could deny a visa for racially discriminatory 
reasons, to which the government answered in the affirmative. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–
13, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-1402_1a7d.pdf. 
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Denying them health care means that the government will incur far greater 
health care costs down the road for conditions that could have been 
prevented or treated much more easily earlier on. Furthermore, for the 
DACA recipients themselves, delayed care may cause irreversible harm. 
Singling out this subgroup of individuals with deferred action status, 
who are the least culpable for their current status, for exclusion from 
affordable health coverage makes no legal or moral sense. Either deferred 
action status constitutes lawful presence in the United States or it does not, 
but to say some individuals with this status are lawfully present while 
others are not is totally arbitrary and opens the door to other kinds of 
discrimination against politically unpopular groups. Such arbitrary 
discrimination demands scrutiny under equal protection principles. Yet 
those principles are currently in a state of chaos. 
Confusion and conflict exist regarding alienage-based classifications 
made by both the federal and state governments, as well as in hybrid 
situations. The lack of clarity in these areas makes it challenging to 
analyze the exclusion of DACA recipients by HHS, a federal agency that 
lacks immigration expertise. Nevertheless, heightened scrutiny is 
appropriate. Even under rational basis review, however, the regulation 
excluding DACA recipients from the definition of “lawfully present” 
should not survive. Acknowledging that the Court no longer actually 
follows a tiered approach and explicitly embracing a more flexible sliding 
scale would make the analysis much more straightforward and better 
reflect the Constitution’s equal protection values. While we may be blind 
to the injustices of our own times, we need not turn a blind eye to the 
disintegration of the tiered framework that was designed to address such 
injustice. 
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